Exhausted from days of fighting, Kurdish women are leading a pincer movement against Isis on the road that leads to the jihadists’ Syrian capital

First topic message reminder :

The Kurdish soldiers relax half a mile behind the front line where they have been battling Isis forces west of the Syrian town of Ras al-Ayn. The women are in no doubt about why they are fighting. Nujaan, who is 27 and has been a soldier for four years, says that Isis’s “target is women”. She says: “Look at Shingal [in Iraq] where they raped the women and massacred the men. It is a matter of honour to defend ourselves first, and then our families and lands.” Sitting beside her is Zenya, 22, who adds that she also “is fighting for myself and my family”.


http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-meet-the-kurdish-womens-militia-fighting-for-their-families-west-of-the-syrian-town-of-ras-alayn-10274956.html

Tommy Monk wrote:You are conflating issues again dodge...

No, just giving you both a history lesson and a lesson on strategy.

Waffle dodge...

Tommy Monk wrote:

Waffle dodge...

Well as seen I provided you with some history and strategy and what have you done in reply.

First denial of the facts.
Now ignoring the facts.

What did you counter back with?

Nothing except excuses not to.

The taliban were never in Iraq and al Q were only there after the bush Blair war...

Tommy Monk wrote:

Raggamuffin wrote:

They're not stupid, they see people suffering and they want something done. It could work in the short term of course, but in the long term it would probably just cause another power vacuum.

Thank you rags!

And You are quite right!

I was against the bush/Blair Iraq war, I didn't believe the bullshit reasons for it.

We had Iraq under lock down since early 90's and knew full well there were no WDM!!!

Keeping that lock down situation was the best scenario and we should have kept hold of it until such a time as change was peacefully achieved.

Unfortunately, we weren't dealing with that war, except as a cause for the current predicament.

This discussion started with nicko claiming we should make the same mistakes all over again. He claimed we should get involved again, and take ISIS out.

That would be most foolish.

Tommy Monk wrote:The taliban were never in Iraq and al Q were only there after the bush Blair war...

Point so over your head again.
Priority for securing Afghanistan was ceded to priority for the Iraq war, thus many forces were taken from this theater of operations. As soon as the allies prioritized the Iraq invasion this allowed the Taliban to reform and then even after the defeat of the Saddam, they faced insurgencies in both countries, a near impossible task to control and not something any strategist would advise.

Tommy Monk wrote:The taliban were never in Iraq and al Q were only there after the bush Blair war...

That is completely false, and I think you know it. Al Qaeda in Iraq was founded by the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999, under the name Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Arabic: جماعة التوحيد والجهاد, "Group of Monotheism and Jihad").

No, al Q were not an active force in Iraq before the bush Blair war but were there after... they were driven out by the Iraqis themselves.

Judicial Watch has – for many years – obtained sensitive U.S. government documents through freedom of information requests and lawsuits.

The government just produced documents to Judicial Watch in response to a freedom of information suit which show that the West has long supported ISIS. The documents were written by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency on August 12, 2012 … years before ISIS burst onto the world stage.

Here are screenshots from the documents. We have highlighted the relevant parts in yellow:



Why is this important? It shows that extreme Muslim terrorists – salafists, Muslims Brotherhood, and AQI (i.e. Al Qaeda in Iraq) – have always been the “major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.”

This verifies what the alternative media has been saying for years: there aren’t any moderate rebels in Syria (and see this, this and this).

The newly-declassified document continues:



Yes, you read that correctly:

… there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist Principality in eastern Syria (Hasaka and Der Zor), and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime ….

In other words, the powers supporting the Syrian opposition – the West, our Gulf allies, and Turkey wanted an Islamic caliphate in order to challenge Syrian president Assad.

Sure, top U.S. generals – and vice president Vice President Joe Biden – have said that America’s closest allies support ISIS. And mainstream American media have called for direct support of ISIS.

But the declassified DIA documents show that the U.S. and the West supported ISIS at its inception … as a way to isolate the Syrian government. And see this.

This is a big deal. A former British Army and Metropolitan Police counter-terrorism intelligence officer and a former MI5 officer confirm that the newly-released documents are a smoking gun.

This is a train wreck long in the making.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/newly-declassified-u-s-government-documents-the-west-supported-the-creation-of-isis/5451640

Because I knew Didge hadn't actual read the Pentagon paper

Joe Biden admitted it:

Biden’s Admission: US Allies Armed ISIS
http://www.globalresearch.ca/bidens-admission-us-allies-armed-isis/5406539

He of course left out the bit that US had armed them as well, but that is documented to:

CIA begins weapons delivery to Syrian rebels
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-begins-weapons-delivery-to-syrian-rebels/2013/09/11/9fcf2ed8-1b0c-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_story.html

Tommy Monk wrote:No, al Q were not an active force in Iraq before the bush Blair war but were there after... they were driven out by the Iraqis themselves.

For once Tommy you are spot on, the Sons of Iraq drove them out, as recognised by the US Army and they were not there before the invasion.

Perhaps Quill should watch this:

Secret Iraq (award winning series that showed the truth in Iraq)

http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00v8t2t

&

How the "Sons of Iraq" Stabilized Iraq

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 8, 2008, Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. and coalition forces commander in Iraq, reported a dramatic reduction in violence levels and civilian deaths from fifteen months before when Iraq seemed on the brink of civil war.[1] Petraeus attributed this turning point to the increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces, part of the surge declared by President George W. Bush in January 2007, but he gave equal credit to the predominantly Sunni popular movement known as the Sons of Iraq (SOI). "These volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas," he said. "With their assistance and with relentless pursuit of al-Qaeda-Iraq, the threat posed by AQI, while still lethal and substantial, has been reduced significantly."[2]

Initially known as al-Anbar Awakening (Sahwat al-Anbar), the movement made its appearance in the summer of 2006 when local sheikhs, disillusioned with the insurgency that had ravaged the province during the past two-and-a-half years, offered their support to the coalition forces. While pundits and commentators have varyingly acknowledged the significance of the movement, less is known about the motives and the thoughts of its key participants, including those members of the coalition forces with whom the Awakening worked.

What motivated these Sunni tribesmen to sign loyalty oaths to fight for an Iraqi government with whom they had only recently battled viciously? What were U.S. officers thinking when they provided military training and money for arms and equipment to men who, more often than not, had been their enemies just a short time before?

While the program was successful in reducing violence and quickly spread throughout Iraq, it did not prevent the ruling Shiite elites from viewing the Sons of Iraq with suspicion. Nor have the achievements of the recent past guaranteed that a true reconciliation between feuding sides has been reached. Through a fascinating series of interviews held in late 2008 and 2009—as the program was being unwound—the outlines of this unlikely social and military development can be glimpsed.
The Sunni Insurgency

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the collapse of Saddam Hussein's repressive regime unleashed sectarian and religious enmities that had been kept in check by the tyrant. As early as April 2003, while coalition forces were still mopping up the last traces of Baath resistance, a prominent Shiite leader, Abdul Majid al-Khoei, who had just returned from exile, was murdered in the holy town of Najaf.[3] Four months later, on August 29, 2003, a car bomb exploded outside that very mosque, killing more than 100 people, including Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, leader of the Iranian-sponsored Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).[4] On February 1, 2004, another 100 people were killed in two suicide bombings in the Kurdish town of Erbil.[5]

While some of this sectarian violence was perpetrated by Islamist Shiite militias that sprang up in southern Iraq in the immediate wake of the invasion, the main instigator was the minority Arab Sunni community, about 20 percent of the total population, which had dominated Iraqi politics for centuries and which resented its exclusion from the new state structures established by the victorious powers.[6] In no time, the "Sunni Triangle"—the vast area between Baghdad in the south, Mosul in the north, and Rutba in the east where most of Iraq's Sunni population resides and consisting of the four governorates of Baghdad, al-Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Ninawa—was in flames.

For some insurgents, notably members of Saddam's regime and tribe, the overriding motivation was loyalty to the fallen tyrant. For others, such as the tens of thousands of soldiers and officers who had lost their jobs when the predominantly Sunni army was dissolved in May 2003, it was a desire for revenge. There was also a deep sense of humiliation felt by those who had long considered themselves the only people capable of running the affairs of the Iraqi state. All feared and resented their possible domination by the despised Shiites and their perceived paymaster—Iran's militant Islamist regime—and all wished to regain lost power and influence.

These grievances were further reinforced by tribal interests, values, and norms. The Sunni Triangle is a diverse mosaic of hundreds of small and medium-sized tribes, as well as a dozen large tribal federations, notably the Dulyam and the Shammar Jarba, each comprising more than a million members. Under Saddam, many of these tribes, especially the Dulyam, had been incorporated into the regime's patronage system. With such material benefits and political prestige curtailed after the U.S.-led invasion, many tribesmen joined the insurrection.

Such was the tenacity of the insurrection that in September 2006, Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, questioned the U.S. ability to defeat it. "It is our job to win," he said. "But it is not the kind of fight that is going to be won by military kinetic action alone … I think the real heart of [the matter] is that there are economic and political conditions that have to improve out at al-Anbar, as they do everywhere in Iraq, for us to be successful."[7]
The Anbar Awakening

To make matters worse, the Sunni Triangle's location near the Jordanian, Syrian, and Saudi borders made it the first port of call for al-Qaeda terrorists and other foreign elements. The overall number of these infiltrators was insignificant compared to the many thousands of Iraqi insurgents—some estimates put the number of al-Qaeda terrorists in Iraq at less than 1,300[8]— but they exerted a disproportionate impact on the course of the fighting by recruiting significant numbers of Iraqi jihadists, providing invaluable military and logistical expertise, and mounting most of the mass-casualty suicide bombings.[9] At the same time, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) expected compensation for the security they helped provide to their local allies, often crossing the line from payment to extortion. Muscling in on time-honored smuggling routes and trying to forcibly wed women in order to build tribal ties exacerbated tensions. But AQI began to overreach in their efforts to control the area. A U.S. Marine colonel cited this example:

Fallujah … I remember the day [March 2007] that I got there. I think it was the secretary of the city council, his nephew … a 12-year old boy [who] was hit by AQI right on the main street in Fallujah. Ran him over with a vehicle several times. Broke several, maybe all his bones. Then threw him on the door step of the secretary of the council's house and shot him in front of everybody. … We couldn't get there. Everybody got there too late. The populace knew who did it. They knew why they did it. … They had had it. That was it. They stopped. They stopped listening to AQI. They turned.[10]

Al-Qaeda's overreaching was coupled with a growing awareness that the Americans, who did not interfere with traditional sources of revenue or seek to change tribal custom, would eventually leave. AQI, on the other hand, was determined to impose its version of Shari'a (Islamic law) on the entire population as a stepping stone to the creation of the worldwide Muslim community (umma).

It was this realization that led to the advent of the Sahwa or Awakening movement. With the coalition anxious for local allies who would help defeat the insurgency and prevent its retrenchment, and a growing number of ordinary Sunnis and tribal leaders increasingly disillusioned with the mayhem and dislocation occasioned by the fighting, a meeting of minds was only a question of time. The acting national security advisor to the Iraqi government Safa Hussein al-Sheikh explained:

Most people don't know that the first time we thought about the Sons of Iraq was ... in 2005 … Things were getting worse from a security point of view ... This was opposed directly and strictly by the leadership of the MNF [Multinational Forces] at that time because they thought this was the creation of militias ... Then at the end of 2005—at that time al-Qaeda had almost full control of Anbar province and other areas—something happened on the border with Syria. It was the Albu Mahan tribe and another tribe, al-Karabla, big tribes on the border. They live mostly on smuggling ... And one of these tribes made some kind of an agreement of understanding with al-Qaeda ... So both tribes there were fighting between themselves ... My colleagues and I advised that we should support the tribes against the tribe [that was allied] with al-Qaeda.[11]

On most occasions, however, the tribes made the first offers to cooperate. A U.S. Army captain related his experience with a first contact:

We had gotten a call in the TOC [Tactical Operations Center], and we were located in Camp Blue Diamond. North of the river was our task force headquarters. And there was a report that one of our task force level HVTs, high value targets enemy personnel, was at the gate and asking to come in and talk with our task force commander ... Hindsight being twenty-twenty and seeing how it played out, it doesn't seem as alarming, but at this time, he was a high value target, was known or had allegedly ... been involved with attacks against coalition forces, had been successful, had been a leader ... How do you react? There had not been a precedent set for something like this. We had never seen anything like this. So it was really an exercise in good faith and you know those were some tense times.[12]

A former insurgent-turned-Sahwa fighter gave his side of the story:

No one supported me in my work but the American forces. They did that because I brought a backhoe, and I bermed all the roads in my area. I left only one road [open] with a checkpoint on it, so I can control my neighborhood since I have only thirteen people working for me. My house is high, so I can monitor the entire area. Even the Americans, they couldn't drive through these [berms] with their tanks and Humvees, but I told them: "There's no need, this is a safe area." The area is about ten kilometers by ten, maybe less. It was closed for all but me. No one can come through this area without being noticed. I was in constant contact with the American soldiers in the area, and we agreed that they will come to my area dismounted. My area is very close to Blue Diamond, which was an American base. The distance between us was three kilometers, so the Americans would stop with their tanks at a distance and would then come to us on foot.[13]

By mid-August 2006, such low level contacts had led to a formal meeting between Col. Sean MacFarland, the newly appointed commander of U.S. forces in Ramadi, and Sheikh Abd as-Sattar Abu Risha, a prominent tribal leader, who had just issued a manifesto denouncing al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and pledging support to U.S. forces. MacFarland described the scene at Abd as-Sattar's home: "The walls were just lined with guys in sheikh robes. … I go down and see the governor about once a week, and it's just me and the governor. I go into Sheikh Sattar's house, and the place is packed."

Soon an agreement was struck, and by November, an estimated 1,500 recruits sent by the sheikh had joined the revamped police training program for Ramadi. In comparison, a mere forty men had previously signed on to the Ramadi police force, then numbering only 150 officers in total.[14]

This collaborative pattern spread rapidly throughout the province, and before long coalition forces were providing training opportunities, first in Jordan then in Anbar, to the growing number of volunteers, who often had previous army or police experience although not to Western standards. A senior marine officer described the recruitment and training process:

You had to kind of read and write. You had to have, I think, twenty-two teeth. … They had mixed standards, and we would vet them and, of course, BAT [Biometrics Automated Toolset System] them ... And so this is all good stuff. But we would build the police and the army by recruiting. And they would recruit and basically use the sheikhs. The next day six hundred or seven hundred guys would show up, and we would put them through the process. Who was eligible, who met the criteria to join the army or the police. So we built the first and seventh Iraqi army divisions, and we increased the police from about 5,000 to almost 28,000 in that year. And that was the Sons of Anbar.[15]

After a probationary period, the volunteers were allowed to carry their own weapons, which many of them bought with money provided by the coalition. There was also an effort to train Iraqi women—the "Daughters of Iraq"—to replace female Marines responsible for female body searches at checkpoints.

Being "concerned local citizens" (CLC, as they were initially called by the coalition), rather than professional soldiers, the Sahwa volunteers were not allowed to carry out offensive operations. Instead, they were tasked to perform defensive missions such as manning checkpoints and providing intelligence on insurgent activities and locations. The dividing line between these activities and actual participation in fighting was, however, more often than not, blurred. A junior U.S. officer recalled:

Although the CLCs were not supposed to be used offensively, there was no stopping them this day because they were pretty amped up about losing some of their friends.

I was on a roof, and I'm talking to F-16s that are flying around, and we've got air weapons teams, and there is a lot of activity ... we're getting ready to move out. Maybe four or five CLCs, a couple of IPs [Iraqi police], a couple of SWATs [Special Weapons and Tactics], ISF [Iraqi Security Forces]. It is just this big mix of dudes.

I talked to the [Sahwa leader] ... who spoke English: "I'm going to be bounding up this way, and we're going to get there. You'll provide over watch, we'll go in and take it. When we say it's clear, then we'll pull you guys in, and then we'll leave you guys up there to control the area."

And he maneuvered his guys up there. And it was just an amazing day.[16]

The new recruits proved particularly efficient in the fight against the al-Qaeda jihadists and their local allies. The Sunnis knew where al-Qaeda fighters lived and worked because they had harbored them initially, and they had no qualms about using the same brutal methods in fighting back. This resulted in a swift routing of al-Qaeda in a revenge-based frenzy: "They hunted al-Qaeda down with a vengeance. They dragged al-Qaeda guys through streets behind cars ... they had videos of feet on the altars in mosques ... It was pretty much just a ruthless slaughter."[17] An Iraqi official recalled how a tribal sheikh gleefully told him how he had a certain al-Qaeda operative beheaded: "And then he smiled and said, 'I want to show you something you will like.' One of the [al-Qaeda] people who tried to assassinate him, and he showed me on the telephone a picture of a head."[18]

At times the savage war against al-Qaeda pitted members of the same tribe against each other. A U.S. colonel recounted this example:

The Zobai tribe came under a lot of friction. They literally told us to stay out of the Habanniya Zoba village-Khandari area for seventy-two hours because Zobai against Zobai were going to fight. Al-Qaeda against the tribe ... al-Qaeda would come into the village, and they would sit down and have a meeting. It is tribal, and they would negotiate, and if they couldn't solve the negotiations, then there was going to be a fight. After twenty-four hours of fighting, they couldn't handle it, and they asked us to come in and support them. So for about the last week of March, we had a fairly significant fight, and for the Zobais, that was the first example and demonstration from the U.S. side that, yes, we will fight against al-Qaeda, and we won't arrest you.[19]

Helping the Surge

Within a year of its advent, the Awakening movement had dramatically changed the security situation in Anbar with monthly attacks dropping from some 1,350 in October 2006 to just over 200 in August 2007.[20] By now, the movement had been established on a national basis as the coalition sought to replicate its success in other parts of Iraq. It played a particularly prominent role in improving the security situation in Baghdad as part of the troop surge, helping to slash murders by 90 percent and attacks on civilians by 80 percent, as well as destroying numerous insurgent networks. Its contribution in other provinces was no less substantial: By the end of the year, al-Qaeda leaders admitted that their forces throughout Iraq had been decimated by over 70 percent, from 12,000 to 3,500.[21]

No less importantly, the Sahwa eventually became a tool for promoting sectarian reconciliation and weaning fighters away from sectarian militias. This process began in fall 2007 in the Baghdad suburb of al-Jihad, a Shiite neighborhood aligned with the radical militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr, where the government sought to elicit mass participation in the Awakening program. Working with these Shiites was difficult because Sadr forbade anyone from dealing with the Americans. Yet, he would broker a cease-fire and enforce it by passing the names of Mahdi Army leaders whom he could not control to the Iraqi government for arrest or elimination with the knowledge that this information would be shared with coalition forces. An Iraqi official recalled:

It was a really ambitious project. There were some successes in al-Jihad in which we brought people from the Sadrists and included them in the Sahwas with close cooperation from Colonel Franks who was the local commander there, and he is an excellent man. His mind is very well-oriented to these kinds of activities. And we first had to talk to the Sadrists in the areas. The environment there is better than any place else to include the Sadrists into the Sahwas because these Sadrists were surrounded by areas of Sunnis.

There was a funny discussion with the leaders there of the Sadrists when I told them. [Usually with] Shiite people, I try to appease their fears and their concerns. [But] I did the opposite there. Increased their fears.

They are not the majority, and they do not have the upper hand. So this is one point. The other point is that the Sadrists, in general, do not have good financial support. And the payment in the Sahwas is pretty good for them. But they have a problem [in] that their leadership will denounce any person who talks to the Americans.

The general concern was that the balance of Sunni-Shiites would change. So I said to them: "It is in your hands. If you don't get your people to join, it will change, and you can do nothing about it." And it was a very hard time for them because they couldn't say, yes, because of Muqtada al-Sadr. So they tried to give me a message that "If we don't know and something is arranged, it is okay." [Laughter]

Once the Jihad area went, the rest of the Sadr areas wanted the money, and they followed suit. But other things happened, and this project wouldn't continue as we wished. When al-Basra operation came, in their minds, the process [ended. Still] al-Jihad was maintained as a quiet area.[22]

This example was, however, more of an exception to the rule as the Iraqi government was slow to acknowledge the merits of the Awakening movement. In fact, as the coalition accelerated recruitment and institutionalized regular salaries to its members, the government remained wary of this large and predominantly Sunni force—which had grown to some 80,000 members by early 2008—and its future political intentions. A senior Iraqi advisor to the coalition forces recalled the situation:

The Shiites thought, it is a conspiracy. That is: al-Qaeda cannot be tolerated, so now they came in other clothes [sic], and they are trying to surround Baghdad. And maybe the Americans, because of the violence, are desperate, and they want to bring the Sunnis back and that is why they support them. So this theory of conspiracy controlled the minds of the Shiites inside the government and popularly.[23]

After much haggling, the Americans managed to persuade Nuri al-Maliki's government to take over the Awakening program and to incorporate it into the newly established security and state structures. In the words of a political advisor to Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, second ranking officer in Iraq at the time and source of much of this behind-the-scenes wrangling:

[What was] very interesting was the cultural difference. The Americans would come every day and say: "Look at how fantastic the Sahwa are and what they are doing," and the Iraqi government just didn't believe it. So the Americans brought more power points—and bigger ones—and paraded them about pointing to all the great things the Sahwa have done. And then with Safa [Hussein al-Sheikh's] advice, we started talking about the bad things that some Sahwa had done. And once we started to admit that some of them were involved in violence and involved in bad things ... then the government felt at last that we were more trustworthy. So that was the famous meeting in December [2007] where General Odierno stood up and said, "Here are the bad things; these are the good things. We want the government really to take control of this program, and this is what we suggest." And the prime minister said, "I agree with everything that General Odierno suggests."[24]

Forging Relationships

On the ground, young officers and soldiers knew little of the higher level maneuvering that went on between the coalition and the Iraqi government. For them, the Sahwas were not abstract programs but human beings who formed close relationships with their coalition colleagues. They suffered casualties alongside the coalition forces; their wounded shared rides in medical helicopters, and they formed the kinds of bonds of mutual trust and respect that can only happen in combat. A U.S. Army platoon leader explains:

We showed up to the JCC [Joint Command Center] to pick up the first round of CLCs we were going to institute across the city. It was just very comical because I've got about half of my platoon with me, and my other half is holding a patrol base where I am getting ready to take some of these guys. We're sitting around the JCC outside the mayor's office and all of the sudden, they come walking in. And they're proud, they're happy, they're like, "I'm part of this thing, and we are going to go do this, and it's going to be great."

There ... were three groups. One we called the classic camouflage because they were all in the same uniform. They all had T-shirts with … a regular woodland camouflage print on it, and it also had the text that read "Classic Camouflage." …

The next group that comes in we called them the Headlamp Platoon because, for some reason, every single one of those guys had a headlamp. So they had no uniform, but they had headlamps. And the last group we called the AQI group because they came in, and … they looked just like jihadists. There was one guy Hassam ... He was a natural leader. … he looked American ... He spoke English pretty well, and he was [a] teacher.

I don't know what [their agenda] was ... But for a period of time, their agenda and our agenda were perfectly aligned, and we all worked together pretty well to secure that place. And we formed pretty tight relationships and we earned their trust ... they earned our trust.[25]

Respect was mutual. Officers who attempted to speak Arabic and who attended Iraqi events and participated in tribal customs were respected. As an Iraqi general and former Sons of Iraq member recalled:

Lt. Col. Silverman is an extraordinary officer. He is special. He worked in the al-Jazeera area ... So he has been able to establish an excellent relationship with these tribes. The relationship that they had between the U.S. Army and the tribes was abnormal … extraordinary … awesome. If they have a funeral, he will go to the funeral reception.

This is our tradition. This is our culture, and he was doing the same thing. He would go into the funeral, and he would say salam aleikum. And he would recite al-Fatiha. I'm sure he doesn't know what it means, al-Fatiha, or he cannot read, but after he finishes, he would do this [wipes his hand over his face]. Exactly how the normal Iraqi people do it. And he would also pay and contribute [to] the funeral reception. The people, the sheikhs, the tribes, they liked him. They were impressed. He was Lawrence of Arabia, Silverman. If we had tribal conflicts, he would sit, and he would judge. … The tribes liked the hookah [water pipe]. He would sit with them, and he would have his hookah with them. You would say this guy, he is an Eastern man. He is Iraqi, but in an American uniform.[26]

The Iraqi general continued:

I would like to tell you the story of an American officer. His name was Patrick [Capt. Travis Patriquin, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division]. He was a friend of Sheikh Sattar. Sheikh Sattar used to call him Hisham, not Patrick, because he had a mustache. He would always sit with Sheikh Sattar's kids. He was very close to the police. He was an extraordinary person … He got hit with an IED [Improvised Explosive Device]—got killed.

We named one of our police stations after him. We called it Hisham Police Station because all the policemen knew him by the name Hisham, not Patrick. Until nowadays Sheikh Sattar insists that we call the police station Hisham, so until now we call it "Martyr Hisham's Police Station." Hisham, who is Patrick.[27]

Col. Richard Welch, an Army reserve officer with counterinsurgency training and a Special Forces background, did not stand out in a crowd, but that belied his intensity and tenacity. He took a pay cut from his job as a prosecutor in Ohio and missed his grandchildren's birthdays and had been in Baghdad for four of the five years from 2004 to 2009. This put him in a unique position to develop relationships that kept people alive. One such relationship was with Sheikh Ali Hatem of the Dulaym tribe, whose grandfather had allegedly ridden with T.E. Lawrence against the Turks. Welch recounted his experience:

Working with the tribes and working with a lot of these religious leaders actually facilitated me getting connected with insurgent leaders on the Sunni side and … militia leaders on the Shiite side. So I began talking with them about what we now call reconciliation … talking to them about how to stop fighting, to try and join the political process …

Most of the other groups out of Baghdad came out of these meetings with the tribal leaders and the community leaders … getting them connected with the brigade commanders and battalion commanders. And they began to work with them ... [Those sheikhs interested in reconciliation] would call and say: "Colonel Welch, al-Qaeda is attacking us and we need help. We need supplies." [During] many of those phone calls you could hear gun shots in the background. You could hear the fighting going on. …

I was out at Camp Liberty [near Baghdad airport] walking to the dining facility with my deputy and my cell phone rang. I noticed that it was Sheikh Ali Hatem so I answered it immediately. He said, "Colonel Welch, I need your help … Al-Qaeda overran Sheikh Hamed Village up in the Taji area, north Taji. And our tribe is getting ready to counterattack and take back the village. But we need you to contact the unit up there because we've seen helicopters flying around, and we don't want them to engage [attack] us ... So we need to let you know which ones." So I said, "Okay, we will take care of it." So I kept Ali Hatem on the line and sent [my deputy] back. I said, "You've got to get the G3 [operational commander on duty] you know." ... Because I couldn't move. I had to get the coverage for my cell phone where it was out at Liberty. So we finally were able to contact the unit, and literally, the helicopter pilot was ready to pull the trigger on them ... The commander told us that later. They were ready to engage these guys. But then instead they flew over watch and supported them taking that village back.[28]

Show Me the Money

Though there was initially no money involved for the Awakening movement, this issue quickly came to the fore. Just as tribal support for the "Great Arab Revolt" against the Ottoman Empire had been motivated by the glitter of British gold and the promise of booty (nearly half-a-century later Lawrence of Arabia would still be remembered by Bedouins as "the man with the gold"),[29] so the Anbar sheikhs were not immune to the allure of American money. Brigade level commanders doled out millions of Iraqi dinars and, in some places, U.S. dollars every month, and by the summer of 2007 the movement was fully subsidized by the coalition. This was one of the reasons the coalition, rather than the Iraqi government, took the lead in the Sahwa program. As a senior Iraqi official explained:

Some people in some areas came to us and wanted to work with the government because they thought for some reason that it was not good for their reputation to work with the Americans to fight al-Qaeda. And our main problem at that time was that the government didn't have the means to completely help them. So at times we felt really embarrassed.[30]

In addition to monthly salaries, the coalition also paid for results. One Sons of Iraq member reported:

Yes, we did that with the support of the coalition forces when we captured some gangsters. After missions, the coalition forces used to issue letters of appreciation for us and gave us a reward. And that was good. I got $700 from the coalition forces: $300 for salary and a $400 reward for a total of $700 in one month—U.S. dollars.

I saw gangsters trying to kidnap a girl. She was driving her vehicle, and I was watching them. I started to shoot and shot one of them. I released her and that is why I got the reward and letter of appreciation.[31]

Such letters of appreciation, on tattered pieces of paper and blurry from being copies of copies with the previous recipients names blanked out, were more valuable than money. A signed letter by the coalition, regardless of whether the words were level on the page, was a sought after status symbol.

In other places, where the security situation was relatively good, coalition funding of Sahwa activities was effectively little more than a jobs program. In the words of a local sheikh:

Let's be honest. They established the Sahwa in our city after all the doors had been shut in our face because there was no chance to hold jobs. The first reason for establishing the Sahwa was because there were no jobs; the second reason—to provide money for the families; and the third reason—to protect the civilian people.

When we joined the Sahwa, we had to remind each other why most of us were insurgents ... Either get us a job or Iraq will go back to the way it used to be.[32]

By January 2009, the U.S. government had invested more than $400 million in the Awakening program with a median monthly cost of more than $21 million, peaking at nearly $39 million in March 2008.[33] For Petraeus, this was a worthwhile investment that not only saved lives in Iraq but also U.S. taxpayers' money. As he told the Senate Armed Services Committee:

These volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to mention the priceless lives saved have far outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts.[34]

As with other fields of U.S. activity in Iraq, the overriding preoccupation with security and stability often resulted in mismanagement and waste. Being totally result-oriented, the coalition forces were primarily interested in having all checkpoints manned, arms caches uncovered, and the violence decreased, leaving the methods for achieving these goals at the sheikhs' discretion. This in turn resulted in serious accountability problems, such as ghost employees and poor control over the distribution of cash payments as the sheikhs habitually rotated people around and took a cut for managing the program. The program was also vulnerable to corruption and embezzlement on the American side, as demonstrated in December 2009 when a U.S. officer was convicted of stealing approximately $690,000 from funds allocated to the Sahwa program and local relief and reconstruction.[35] The Implementation and Follow up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) cleaned up the program when they took over payments in late 2009 by paying the Sahwa directly. However, this did not prevent the sheikhs from taking their share ten feet from the payment point.
Patriots at Last

On September 4, 2008, the Awakening movement's massive contribution to Iraq's national security received a long overdue official recognition when an executive order issued by Prime Minister Maliki officially named its members Sons of Iraq and called for the incorporation of its members into the Iraqi state structures.

The practical implications of this change, however, were far more elusive. Although the Iraqi government undertook to integrate approximately 94,000 SOI personnel (from the 100,000-plus membership list provided by the Americans) into the Iraqi security forces (ISF) or other Iraqi ministries by the end of 2009, by April 2010, only 9,000 had been absorbed by the ISF, and another 30,000 had been hired by non-security ministries.[36] These delays were partly due to the fact that many SOI possessed rudimentary educational credentials (in Baghdad, 81 percent of SOI members had only elementary or middle-school educations) and were, therefore, unfit for many government positions. But this also reflected the government's residual suspicion of the group—as well as other former militias—alongside lingering disagreements with Washington regarding the movement's size and the attendant funds required for its absorption.

While ordinary Sahwa members were slowly incorporated into the state apparatus, the movement's leaders, whose sense of honor prevented them from taking menial government jobs, were looking forward to political careers as part of the national reconciliation process. Their hopes were bolstered by the fact that the Maliki government, knowing that its treatment of the SOI would be viewed by many Sunnis as a litmus test for their future integration into the country's sociopolitical system, assigned the process to the IFCNR.

In what turned out to be a stroke of genius, the head of the committee quickly appointed one of its members, Maj. Gen. Muther al-Mawla, to oversee the transition. An open and affable person, who wore tailored Western suits and readily shared pictures of his grandchildren, Mawla brought a paternal sense of security and calm to the process that put everyone at ease. He would bring in pastries that his wife had baked or share a feast with his coalition colleagues late into the night. At the same time, as former commander of the National Guard and the Iraqi Special Forces for the new government, he was more than capable of holding his own in the bare-knuckle world of Iraqi politics and conducting negotiations with those who, on many occasions, had been on his Special Forces' most wanted list.[37]

The statements of Abu Azzam al-Tamimi, a former Sahwa leader in the Abu-Ghraib area, are most instructive on the issues surrounding ongoing efforts at reconciliation. Sounding hopeful and relaxed at the al-Rashid hotel in Baghdad's International Zone, he expounded on the integration of the neighborhood's SOI in government jobs, his personal safety, and the forthcoming March 2010 elections:

Some of them are still Sahwas till this moment. I got a chance to join them to the Iraqi Security Forces back in 2007. In the middle of 2007, I had coordination with them but not control.

I have no relationship with [Brig. Gen.] Nasser [al-Hitti, commander of the Muthanna 3rd Brigade, Abu Ghraib]. He knew that he had no capability to arrest me, but he was trying to do that.

We are trying to create or establish our own political entity. And that is why we are going to set up a meeting tomorrow here in this hotel to discuss this issue with all the Sahwa leaders.

We have a joint committee now and are negotiating with [Prime Minister] Maliki. Yesterday [Sept. 4, 2009], we met with the main people from the Da'wa party ... Maybe we are going to establish the one front together, or we will have other options.[38]

Some former Sahwa leaders, such as Sa'ad Uraibi Ghafuri (aka Abu Abed), a major and intelligence officer in Saddam's armed forces, are not able to run for office or form political alliances for fear of being arrested. He is in Jordan waiting to get a visa, based on glowing recommendations from American officers who knew him, and seeks a new life in the United States. Some in the Iraqi government, however, see him differently as he wanted to control an area that the government also sought to control. Abu Abed, while in Jordan, discussed his past as sheikh of the Adamiya area in Baghdad:

After a while we defeated al-Qaeda from al-Fadil to Muadam, Palestine Street to Adhamiya [a Baghdad neighborhood]. It was just like one line, one road, we cleared all the area. And I used to … set up meetings with all the leaders from al-Fadil and this Rusafa side weekly. People got to listen to them and to report about that. So all the Iraqi government was watching, and they were surprised how we defeated al-Qaeda in those areas, freed the people, and maintained stability and security in this area.

After that ... the Iranian ambassador in Iraq gave an announcement. And he said [that] all those Sahwas were like gangsters. They are bad people, and we need to get rid of them. … I told him, "If the ambassador has an issue in Iran, let him go and solve his issues in Iran. He is not supposed to be involved in Iraqi matters. He has no right to do that." And after that I got the result. I paid for that because I got a phone call from the colonel [Welch], and he told me, "You need to leave your home because there is an arrest warrant against you for your disagreements with the Iraqi government." So I asked him why? … I have been fighting al-Qaeda, and we defeated al-Qaeda, and the Iraqi government they just gained everything, the benefits of that.

[Gen. Eric E.] Fiel, [Brig.] Gen. [Donald M.] Campbell, and even Gen. David Petraeus, and Gen. Odierno, he visited me in my office too.

During a reconciliation meeting, however, someone tried to kill Abu Abed.

I left my office with eight vehicles, and I used to use my own vehicle. It was a Toyota Land Cruiser armored vehicle, very, very strong. And when I went to Amel al-Shabby Street, I saw those seven hummers there, and the Iraqi soldiers they [had] been walking in the street.

[My security chief] said maybe the guard ... went to drink some chai. I told him no, this is unusual ... They [detonated] a big IED, and the sound of the explosion covered all [of] Baghdad ... I was flying, and I hit one of the vehicles, and I can still remember when I was covered by the rocks and the dust.[39]

Conclusion

Just as the peremptory dissolution of Saddam's army in May 2003 without the existence of an adequate substitute opened the door to insurgencies of all hues, so the disbanding of the social movement that had been instrumental in turning the tide against al-Qaeda in Iraq during 2007-08, and the decision to incorporate its members into ministries rather than the Iraqi security forces has left a dangerous security vacuum. Most SOI in Anbar were incorporated into the Iraqi police and army, but not so in Baghdad.

The 100-plus violent attacks during the March 7, 2010 elections serve as a stark reminder that extremist elements—most notably AQI—continue to pose a clear and real danger to the nascent Iraqi democracy. Across the country, up to 367 people, including 216 civilians, were killed during March, and the pace of killing accelerated in April when more than a hundred people were killed during the first week of the month.[40]

Some senior Iraqi officials are still unable to see the writing on the wall. Gen. Abud Kanbar Hashem Khayun al-Maliki, the Baghdad Operations Center commander, refused to allow the tidal wave of kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings that rocked the capital in the last quarter of 2009 deflect his determination to dissolve the SOI. On November 27, 2009, he stated:

By the time the year is up, we will fulfill the obligation of the order and employ all of them. … Those people have sacrificed a lot, and there were a lot of lost lives and a lot of martyrs. Some of them were martyred for their country, and some were injured, and some were damaged in some way. This is a central plan for the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government was serious about this plan. And they wanted to make sure that this plan is successful and is implemented ... In short, the Sons of Iraq was an experimental plan to implement laws and enforce the rule of law [whose time has come and passed].[41]

http://www.meforum.org/2788/sons-of-iraq


Yep, I know it's long, but I thought I'd educate Quill a bit lol

So obomba led US govt is supporting ISIS...!?


Tell me something I don't know!!!


And if the Tory/lib dem govt here were happy about it they wouldn't have held a vote on arming the "nice" 'Syrian rebels' as a way to get out of doing the same... they would have just gone ahead with it.


It's unbelievable how obomba got a peace prize just for taking office and for not being bush but has since presided over The bombing of more countries than bush ever did, as well as supporting ISIS!!!



But... at least he can still get all the prizes for being the first (half white half black) black president... although the people who are applauding this are the same people who are telling us that we are all The same and colour doesn't matter...!!!


All in the name of equality mind...!!!



Are these people now going to hold him to account for his crimes or make excuses for him because he is black like they regularly do for other black criminals...!?


Again, all in the name of equality!!!

Sassy... I only speak the truth... when I disagree with you, it is not because I am simply taking a partisan position against you or that I am lying... it is simply the truth...!


When you start realising this, you will also start to realise how you are being played and misled by your own politically affiliated puppet masters, So as to create And stoke argument and division...

Sorry Tommy, but there are many, many things you speak that are not the truth, not by any stretch of the imagination.   And unlike you, I research everything and I listen to people who actually experience things before I make up my mind.  The Conservatives and their masters, the rich and powerful, are playing people like you for fools, and you swallow every drop of propaganda and come back for more.

They deliberately set out to turn ordinary people against each other so that they can carry on doing what they want and making sure their nests are continuously feathered, and don't give a flying fuck about the likes of you, or me. or especially people at the bottom, who they regard as nuisances for demanding to be treated like human beings.

You're the puppet Tommy, and I can see your strings from here.

Tommy Monk wrote:So obomba led US govt is supporting ISIS...!?


Tell me something I don't know!!!


And if the Tory/lib dem govt here were happy about it they wouldn't have held a vote on arming the "nice" 'Syrian rebels' as a way to get out of doing the same... they would have just gone ahead with it.


It's unbelievable how obomba got a peace prize just for taking office and for not being bush but has since presided over The bombing of more countries than bush ever did, as well as supporting ISIS!!!



But... at least he can still get all the prizes for being the first (half white half black) black president... although the people who are applauding this are the same people who are telling us that we are all The same and colour doesn't matter...!!!


All in the name of equality mind...!!!



Are these people now going to hold him to account for his crimes or make excuses for him because he is black like they regularly do for other black criminals...!?


Again, all in the name of equality!!!

All in the name of equality Tommy, when are they going to hold Bush and Rumsfield and Cheyney to account for their crimes?

Re your last post... should have already happened... and Blair!!!



Post before... I am not a Tory... lib lab con are full of the same corrupt people with The same puppet masters.

I agree, and Blair, actually got to tell him so. He didn't like it.

Tommy Monk wrote:No, al Q were not an active force in Iraq before the bush Blair war but were there after... they were driven out by the Iraqis themselves.

I said, it operated under a different name. Here:

Wiki wrote:The group was founded by the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999 under the name Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Arabic: جماعة التوحيد والجهاد, "Group of Monotheism and Jihad").

The group is believed to have started bomb attacks in Iraq as of August 2003, five months after the coalition invasion and occupation of Iraq, targeting UN representatives, Iraqi Shiite institutions, the Jordanian embassy, provisional Iraqi government institutions.

After pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network in October 2004, its official name became Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn.

Quill, Al Qaeda was in existence long before then, but had no presence in Iraq before the invasion, Sadam kept them out.

1979-1989: Soviet War in Afghanistan and the beginnings of al Qaeda

The true roots of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network stem from the decade-long conflict that plagued Afghanistan from 1979-1989. After Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union, the Afghan Islamist extremists found a rallying call for their cause, as young Muslims from around the world came to Afghanistan to volunteer in what was being called a "holy war," or jihad, against the invading Soviets. One of these young Muslims was a 23 year old from Saudi Arabia named "Usama" bin Ladin.

Son of a wealthy construction magnate, bin Ladin had taken to the religious sermons of Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian and disciple of Sayyid Qutb. While he participated in few actual battles in Afghanistan, bin Laden became known for his generous funding of the jihad against the Soviets.

However, bin Laden's ambitions extended beyond the boarders of Afghanistan, and he began to develop a complex international organization. He set up a financial support network known as the "Golden Chain," comprised mainly of financiers from Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf states. Using this immense new fund, bin Laden and Azzam created a "Bureau of Services," which helped channel recruits for the jihad into Afghanistan. With Saudi Arabia and the United States pouring in billions of dollars worth of secret assistance to rebels in Afghanistan, the jihad against the Soviets was constantly gaining momentum.

1989-1996: Early al Qaeda attacks from Sudan

When the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in early 1989, bin Laden and Azzam decided that their new organization should not dissolve. They established what they called a base (al Qaeda) as a potential general headquarters for future jihad. However, bin Laden, now the clear emir of al Qaeda, and Azzam differed on where the organization's future objectives should lie. Azzam favored continued fighting in Afghanistan until there was a true Islamist government, while bin Laden wanted to prepare al Qaeda to fight anywhere in the world. When Azzam was killed in 1989, bin Laden assumed full charge of al Qaeda.

After leaving Afghanistan and being exiled by Saudi Arabia, bin Laden moved to Sudan, and with him went the base of operations for al Qaeda. From the sanctuary of Sudan, bin Laden began synching up with groups from all over the Middle East and northern Africa, and began laying the groundwork for his jihad against the West.

Beginning with a fatwa called against the United States' deployment to Somalia, bin Laden would continually plan and aid attacks against the United States. Al Qaeda trainers allegedly aided in downing two Black Hawk helicopters in 1993. Bin Laden and al Qaeda also took credit for the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. In 1995, al Qaeda associates were responsible for a car bomb that exploded outside a Saudi-U.S. joint facility in Saudi Arabia that was used to train the Saudi National Guard.

1996-2000: The rise of the Taliban resurrects al Qaeda

Due to mounting international pressure, Sudan forced bin Laden to return to Afghanistan, where he struggled to rebuild his terrorist network. It was not until the rise of the Taliban that bin Laden had al Qaeda working again, and had enough confidence to issue his 1998 fatwa against the United States and its citizens. By this time, al Qaeda had merged with the Egyptian Islamist Jihad, headed by Ayman al-Zawahri, who would become number two in command to bin Laden. Al Qaeda was now the general headquarters for international terrorism.

While previous acts by al Qaeda had involved training, funding and aiding other groups, the new refuge in Afghanistan allowed for bin Laden to take his organization to the next level. In 1998, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were attacked by terrorists, yet this time, it was planned, directed and executed solely by al Qaeda and bin Laden. Al Qaeda would also be responsible for the 2000 strike against the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, which left 17 American sailors dead.

2001- September 11 and al Qaeda Today

On September 11, 2001 al Qaeda executed its most devastating attack against the United States, killing nearly 3,000 civilians. However, the United States military response in Afghanistan would serve to cripple al Qaeda for a significant amount of time. With the protection of the Taliban gone and bin Laden in hiding, al Qaeda became far more decentralized, with operational commanders and cell leaders making the command decisions previously made by bin Laden. However, as a recent National Intelligence Estimate report showed, al Qaeda is once again gaining strength, and has significantly rebuilt itself despite U.S. efforts.

http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/07272007/alqaeda.html

'comprised mainly of financiers from Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf states' - it is disputed that it was just them, as it was known he was at CIA training camps and:

Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary in the UK from 1997–2001, believed the CIA had provided arms to the Arab Mujahideen, including Osama bin Laden, writing, "Bin Laden was, though, a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies. Throughout the 80s he was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan." His source for this is unclear.[2]

In conversation with former British Defence Secretary Michael Portillo, two-time Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto said Osama bin Laden was initially pro-American.[3] Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia, has also stated that bin Laden once expressed appreciation for the United States' help in Afghanistan. On CNN's Larry King program he said:[4]

Bandar bin Sultan: This is ironic. In the mid-'80s, if you remember, we and the United - Saudi Arabia and the United States were supporting the Mujahideen to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviets. He [Osama bin Laden] came to thank me for my efforts to bring the Americans, our friends, to help us against the atheists, he said the communists. Isn't it ironic?

Larry King: How ironic. In other words, he came to thank you for helping bring America to help him.

Bandar bin Sultan: Right.

Former FBI translator and whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, interviewed by Brad Friedman on the The Mike Malloy Show on June 2009 has stated: "I have information about things that our government has lied to us about. I know. For example, to say that since the fall of the Soviet Union we ceased all of our intimate relationship with Bin Laden and the Taliban - those things can be proven as lies, very easily, based on the information they classified in my case, because we did carry very intimate relationship with these people, and it involves Central Asia, all the way up to September 11

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA%E2%80%93al-Qaeda_controversy


NEW YORK, Aug. 24, 1998 — At the CIA, it happens often enough to have a code name: Blowback. Simply defined, this is the term describing an agent, an operative or an operation that has turned on its creators. Osama bin Laden, our new public enemy Number 1, is the personification of blowback. And the fact that he is viewed as a hero by millions in the Islamic world proves again the old adage: Reap what you sow.

Befpre up click on my face and call me naive, let me concede some points. Yes, the West needed Josef Stalin to defeat Hitler. Yes, there were times during the Cold War when supporting one villain (Cambodia’s Lon Nol, for instance) would have been better than the alternative (Pol Pot). So yes, there are times when any nation must hold its nose and shake hands with the devil for the long-term good of the planet.

But just as surely, there are times when the United States, faced with such moral dilemmas, should have resisted the temptation to act. Arming a multi-national coalition of Islamic extremists in Afghanistan during the 1980s - well after the destruction of the Marine barracks in Beirut or the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 - was one of those times.

BIN LADEN’S BEGINNINGS

As anyone who has bothered to read this far certainly knows by now, bin Laden is the heir to Saudi construction fortune who, at least since the early 1990s, has used that money to finance countless attacks on U.S. interests and those of its Arab allies around the world.

As his unclassified CIA biography states, bin Laden left Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan after Moscow’s invasion in 1979. By 1984, he was running a front organization known as Maktab al-Khidamar - the MAK - which funneled money, arms and fighters from the outside world into the Afghan war.

What the CIA bio conveniently fails to specify (in its unclassified form, at least) is that the MAK was nurtured by Pakistan’s state security services, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, the CIA’s primary conduit for conducting the covert war against Moscow’s occupation.

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3340101/t/bin-laden-comes-home-roost/#.VWWJFEaVx1Q

risingsun wrote:I agree, and Blair, actually got to tell him so.  He didn't like it.

Sassy, what is your view on Blair re the Iraq invasion? Do you think that he really believed there were WMD or not? I don't get why he would just take someone's word for that. He strikes me as an intelligent man.

If you had put in the whole of the extract from Wiki:

Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Arabic: جماعة التوحيد والجهاد‎, Organization of Monotheism and Jihad) was a militant Jihadist[1] group led by the Jordanian national Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This group's name may be abbreviated as JTJ or shortened to Tawhid and Jihad, Tawhid wal-Jihad, Tawhid al-Jihad, Al Tawhid or Tawhid. The group started in Jordan, then became a decentralized network during the Iraq insurgency in which foreign fighters were widely thought to play a key role,[3] though some analysts said that it may have also had a considerable Iraqi membership.[4] Following al-Zarqawi's pledge of allegiance to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network on October 17, 2004, the group became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (official name Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn).[2][5][6][7] After several rounds of name changes and mergers with other groups, the organization is now known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS).

it would be seen they were separate to Al Qaeda before the invasion, were the people Saddam kept out of Iraq and the insurgency started after the invasion and after Saddam wasn't around any more to stop them.

The insurgency in Iraq began after the 2003 invasion, and lasted throughout the ensuing Iraq War (2003-2011). The first phase of insurgency began shortly after the 2003 invasion and prior to the establishment of the new Iraqi government. From around 2004 to May 2007, the insurgency primarily targeted Coalition armies,[1] while latterly, Iraqi security forces, seen as collaborators with the coalition also became targeted.

With the full-scale eruption of the civil war in February 2006, many militant attacks in American-controlled central Iraq had been directed at the Iraqi police and military forces of the Iraqi government. The attacks had continued during the transitional reconstruction of Iraq, as the Iraqi government tried to establish itself. Civil war violence decreased in late 2008 and the insurgency continued through the United States withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. After the American withdrawal in December 2011, a renewed wave of sectarian and anti-government insurgency has swept Iraq, causing thousands of casualties in 2012. Increasing violence in 2013 raised fears of another civil war.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_insurgency_%282003%E2%80%9311%29

So, by invading Iraq we let them loose there, then compounded the folly by giving arms to militant groups in Syria, ie ISIS.

Clever, really clever.

The other thing is - they were going to have another resolution to authorise the Iraq invasion, but the French and others said in advance they would veto it, so it didn't go ahead. If the French had not made that announcement in advance, and the vote had gone ahead, what would have happened when it failed?

Raggamuffin wrote:

risingsun wrote:I agree, and Blair, actually got to tell him so.  He didn't like it.

Sassy, what is your view on Blair re the Iraq invasion? Do you think that he really believed there were WMD or not? I don't get why he would just take someone's word for that. He strikes me as an intelligent man.

I marched against the invasion, I don't think for one second he thought there were WMDs, he had been plotting it with Bush long before that, and he was the oiliest bastard I have ever met, who would have joined any party he thought he could get into power with. Think that covers it LOL

Raggamuffin wrote:The other thing is - they were going to have another resolution to authorise the Iraq invasion, but the French and others said in advance they would veto it, so it didn't go ahead. If the French had not made that announcement in advance, and the vote had gone ahead, what would have happened when it failed?

He would have pulled any trick he could to get us there, he had promised Bush.  The Attorney General originally said it was illegal, but was sat on until he changed his mind.

Robin Cook knew exactly what was going on and resigned because of it.

Saddam and al-Qaeda
By Debra Baker
Claims that there were no links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda are wrong. Documents just released by the Pentagon prove it.

In March 2008, the Pentagon released a document that details some of the classified documents from Saddam's regime.  This document called the Iraqi Perspectives Project Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents Volume 1 (Redacted) is an overview of "more than 600,000 original captured documents and several thousand hours of audio and video footage archived in a US Department of Defense (DOD) database. As of August 2006, only 15 percent of the captured documents have English translations."[1]  This document provides insight into how Saddam operated his regime and his ties to terrorism. 

al-Qaeda 

Al-Qaeda is not a top-down hierarchical organization, but a mesh of organizations that work together to the same ends - destroying Zionists and Israelis by whatever means necessary.  As described by Neil Patrick, a Middle East specialist, al-Qaeda is "a loose confederation with various assignments given to various groups."[2]  Osama bin Ladin is at the helm of this loose confederation. 

The Council on Foreign Relations states that al-Qaeda is affiliated with the following terrorist organizations:

• Egyptian Islamic Jihad
  
• The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
  
• Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen)
  
• Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad (Iraq)
  
• Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad (Kashmir)
  
• Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
  
• Salafist Group for Call and Combat and the Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
  
• Abu Sayyaf Group (Malaysia, Philippines)
  
• Jemaah Islamiya (Southeast Asia)"[3]
  

These groups are interconnected; the Council on Foreign Relations states:

"bin Laden's terror network grew out of Egyptian extremist groups, and many of al-Qaeda's leaders are Egyptians.  In recent years, bin Laden brought two leaders of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Ayman al-Zawahiri and the late Muhammad Atef, into the top echelons of al-Qaeda. In addition, some members of Jamaat al-Islamiyya have reportedly joined al-Qaeda. Overall, dozens of Egyptian militants passed through al-Qaeda training camps in Taliban-run Afghanistan."

Who is the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)?

The EIJ "assassinated president Anwar Sadat in 1981 and later teamed up with Osama Bin Laden in the Afghan war against the Soviet occupation."[4]  In 1998, the EIJ merged with al-Qaeda and "is now a wholly owned subsidiary of al-Qaeda," says Steven Cook, a Middle East expert and the Douglas A. Dillon fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.  The group's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is widely regarded as Osama bin Laden's chief deputy."[5]

Now let's look closely at what the Pentagon papers state on Saddam and terrorism.

"Saddam's interest in, and support for, non-Iraqi non-state actors was spread across a wide variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. For years, Saddam maintained training camps for foreign ‘fighters' drawn from these diverse groups. In some cases, particularly for Palestinians, Saddam was also a strong financial supporter. Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al-Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led at one time by bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri) or that generally shared al-Qaeda's stated goals and objectives."[6] 

Is the EIJ associated with al-Qaeda?  According to the Council on Foreign Affairs, the EIJ is a "wholly owned subsidiary of al-Qaeda."[7]  Considering the September 11, 2001 attack on the US was conducted by both Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, the facts support the Council on Foreign Affairs description of al-Qaeda.   Ayman al-Zawahiri was the leader of the EIJ before it merged with al-Qaeda in 1998.  Now let's take a closer look at Saddam and his regime of terror.

On page 16 of the Pentagon papers, there is a memorandum that lists the many terrorist groups that Iraq was supporting.  The memorandum was written by the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and is labeled as Extract 10.   The recipient of this memorandum was Saddam a decade before Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In Extract 10 it lists the EIJ:

"Islamic Jihad Organization [Egyptian Islamic Jihad]

In a meeting in the Sudan we agreed to renew our relations with the Islamic Jihad Organization in Egypt. Our information on the group is as follows:

•  It was established in 1979.
  
•  Its goal is to apply the Islamic shari' a law and establish Islamic rule.
  
•  It is considered one of the most brutal Egyptian organizations.
  
•  It carried out numerous successful operations, including the assassination of Sadat.
  
•  We have previously met with the organization's representative and we agreed on a plan to carry out commando operations against the Egyptian regime."[8]
  

In Extract 12 on page 16 of the Pentagon papers, there is another memorandum that was drafted in Saddam's office which specifically shows that Saddam was directly financing and training the EIJ:

"Office of the President of the Republic - Secretary

Subject: Carrying out a directive

"There has been agreement since December 24, 1990, with the representative of the Islamic Group organization in Egypt on a plan to move against the Egyptian regime by carrying out commando operations provided that we guarantee them financing and training and provide them with the requirements in accordance with the honorable order of the President [Saddam Hussein] which calls for carrying out commando operations against hostile alliance governments. Afterwards, the operations will cease immediately after the ceasefire. 

"With respect to the proposal of our special security agency [IIS] regarding calling a representative of the Islamic Group in Egypt to Iraq in our topsecret personal letter dated 11 March 1993. This letter was in response to the President directing that only financial support is available for now. Intelligence operatives and contacts should be maintained in any movement in the Arab homeland, as indicated by the President in a top-secret letter, dated 25 March 1992. [Emphasis added]"[9]

Saddam and State Terrorism

Saddam was in the business of terror.  From the recruitment, training, financing, and support of terrorism, Saddam formed an alliance with terror.  Of course Saddam obtained control of Iraq via his terrorist Baath party, but the Pentagon Papers on Saddam reveal much more to Saddam's terrorist ties.  The UN sanctions imposed after the 1991 Gulf War,

"reduced Saddam's ability to shape regional and world events, steadily draining his military, economic, and military powers. The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam's "coercion" toolbox, not only cost effective but a formal instrument of state power."[10]  

The UN sanctions were working, but Saddam being resourceful saw the jihadist movement as a vehicle to carry out his anti-American and anti-Israeli actions.

Terrorist Training Camps in Iraq

Saddam had terrorist training camps within Iraq.  The Pentagon report on Saddam goes on to say that "captured Iraqi archives reveal that Saddam was training Arab fighters (non-Iraqi) in Iraqi training camps more than a decade prior to Operation Desert Storm (1991).  A Saddam memorandum directed the IIS to submit a list of foreign nationals who were trained in Iraq and carried out operations during the 1991 war against the United States.  In response, the IIS sent a list of one-hundred names of foreign national fighters, categorized by country"[11]

 "[Foreign national fighters by country]

•  Palestine 38
  
•  Lebanon 10
  
•  Tunisia 8
  
•  Egypt 4
  
•  Libya 1
  
•  Sudan 18
  
•  Syria 10
  
•  Eritrea 7
  
•  Morocco 3
  
•  Unknown 1"[12]
  

The Pentagon papers on Saddam state:

"under Saddam, the Iraqi regime used its paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam training camps to train terrorists for use inside and outside Iraq.  In 1999, the top ten graduates of each Fedayeen Saddam class were specifically chosen for assignment to London, from there to be ready to conduct operations anywhere in Europe."[13]  Saddam was training non-Iraqi's to carry out terrorist actions throughout Europe. 

The Pentagon papers on Saddam go on to explain the following specific training that was supplied in Iraq:

• "Re-equipping and training Palestinian fighters in al-Quds training camps [in Iraq].
  
• Establishing and activating a course to train Arab Liberation Front fighters on martyrdom operations.
  
• Establishing fighter schools for Arab volunteers and later Iraqi volunteers.
  
• Re-establishing and re-equipping the military base of the Arab Liberation Front.
  
• Training groups from the occupied territories [Palestine] on light weapons and tanks in secret thirty-day courses." [14]
  

State Support of Terrorism

Saddam provided support to terrorists that only a state could provide by issuing passports to known terrorists so they could move about freely.  The Pentagon papers on Saddam state the

"M8 annual report also notes that among the 699 passports, renewals, and other official documentation that the IIS issued, many were issued to known members of terrorist organizations."[15]

A specific example of Saddam issuing passports to and harboring a known terrorist is Abu aI-Abbas, a Palestinian Liberation Front leader.  Saddam allowed Abu aI-Abbas and his wife to live in Iraq under Saddam's protection.  Saddam went so far as to issue both Abu aI-Abbas and his wife diplomatic passports so they could travel the Middle East freely.  "Abu aI-Abbas originally fled to Iraq to avoid an Italian warrant imposing five life terms for his part in the 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro and the murder of an American citizen." [16]

Funding of Terrorism

Not only did Saddam provide training and support to terrorists, Saddam readily financed them. 

Saddam was financing the EIJ from at least 1990 and after based on the letter drafted by the Office of the President of the Republic -- Secretary (Extract 12).  A specific example is a memo that was "drafted in Saddam's office, it refers to an agreement with Islamic terrorists to conduct operations against the Egyptian regime during the first Gulf War (1991) and for continued financial support for the terrorists after hostilities ended."[17] 

In conclusion, the Pentagon Papers clearly show that Saddam had direct ties to the EIJ.  Saddam was both financing and training EIJ members from as far back as 1990.  The support Saddam was providing was ongoing.  According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the EIJ merged with al-Qaeda in 1998.  Therefore, Saddam was financing and training al-Qaeda. 

The Pentagon papers only stated the EIJ link, not specifically the al-Qaeda link.  The second in command of al-Qaeda and the person who masterminded 9/11 is Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Ayman al-Zawahiri was the leader of the EIJ prior to its 1998 merging with al-Qaeda.  This truth has been subverted by the media.  All the major media outlets have just quoted what is written in the Executive Summary of the document which states that there is no "smoking gun[18]."  But upon further investigation of the EIJ, a direct link between al-Qaeda and Saddam's Iraq is seen.

Debra Baker is the proprietor of Veer Right  Weblog.

Works Cited

"Al-Qaeda (a.K.a. Al-Qaida, Al-Qa'Ida)." Council on Foreign Relations. 7 July 2005. Council on Foreign Relations. 31 Mar. 2008. 

Ford, Peter, Sara B. Miller, and Courtney Walsh. "Al Qaeda's Veil Begins to Lift." Christian Science Monitor 94 (2001):  6. Newspaper Source. EBSCO. Wake County, Cary, NC. 30 Mar. 2008. Keyword: Al Qaeda and DE QAIDA (Organization).

"Jihad Leader's 'Conversion' Could Rattle Al-Qaeda." Irish Times (2007). EBSCO. Wake County, Cary, NC. 30 Mar. 2008. 

Pan, Esther. "EGYPT: Islamist Opposition Groups." Council on Foreign Relations. Aug. 2005. 31 Mar. 2008

"Salman Pak / Al Salman." Global Security. 31 Mar. 2008. 

"Top Lieutenant `Far More Dangerous' Than Osama Bin Laden." Knight Ridder Tribune Washington Bureau (DC) (2001). EBSCO. Wake County, Cary, NC. 30 Mar. 2008. 

Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey. United States. Pentagon. Department of Defense. Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008. 

---

[1] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), Foreword.

[2] Ford, Peter, Miller Sara B, Walsh, Courtney, "Al Qaeda's Veil Begins to Lift", (Christian Science Monitor, 2001) 6.

[3] Al-Qaeda (a.K.a. Al-Qaida, Al-Qa'Ida)" (Council on Foreign Relations, 7 July 2005).

[4] "Jihad Leader's 'Conversion' Could Rattle Al-Qaeda" (Irish Times,2007)

[5] Pan, Esther "EGYPT: Islamist Opposition Groups" (Council on Foreign Relations, Aug. 2005)

[6] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.48.

[7] Pan, Esther "EGYPT: Islamist Opposition Groups" (Council on Foreign Relations, Aug. 2005)

[8] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.14.

[9] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.16.

[10] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.45.

[11] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.15.

[12] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam, p.16

[13] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.1.

[14] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.19-20.

[15] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.19.

[16] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.27.

[17] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.16.

[18] Woods, Kevin M., and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents (Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), p.ES-1.


Claims that there were no links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda are wrong. Documents just released by the Pentagon prove it.

risingsun wrote:

Raggamuffin wrote:The other thing is - they were going to have another resolution to authorise the Iraq invasion, but the French and others said in advance they would veto it, so it didn't go ahead. If the French had not made that announcement in advance, and the vote had gone ahead, what would have happened when it failed?

He would have pulled any trick he could to get us there, he had promised Bush.  The Attorney General originally said it was illegal, but was sat on until he changed his mind.

Robin Cook knew exactly what was going on and resigned because of it.

Well they did pull the trick of saying that the previous Resolution 1441 was sufficient. If it was sufficient, there was no need for them to have a further resolution, so they clearly didn't think it was sufficient.

Why did the French announce in advance that they would veto any resolution to authorise the invasion?

Well, they would try and find a link wouldn't they Didge?  But it was The Sons of Iraq who got rid of the first lot of Al Qaeda in Iraq, after the invasion, and all that lot proves is that the Pentagon, not known for telling the truth, were desperate to justify the invasion because they knew they had fucked up royaly.

And now they are doing it again.

Raggamuffin wrote:

risingsun wrote:

He would have pulled any trick he could to get us there, he had promised Bush.  The Attorney General originally said it was illegal, but was sat on until he changed his mind.

Robin Cook knew exactly what was going on and resigned because of it.

Well they did pull the trick of saying that the previous Resolution 1441 was sufficient. If it was sufficient, there was no need for them to have a further resolution, so they clearly didn't think it was sufficient.

Why did the French announce in advance that they would veto any resolution to authorise the invasion?

Well, never have met a French Government official I can only guess, but I'd say they could see through Bush myself.

risingsun wrote:

Raggamuffin wrote:

Well they did pull the trick of saying that the previous Resolution 1441 was sufficient. If it was sufficient, there was no need for them to have a further resolution, so they clearly didn't think it was sufficient.

Why did the French announce in advance that they would veto any resolution to authorise the invasion?

Well, never have met a French Government official I can only guess, but I'd say they could see through Bush myself.

Yes, but why not keep quiet and let the proposed resolution go ahead, and then scupper it?

Wish I knew, it might have helped.

Anyway, as I am in the middle of moving, must get on. Will take it up later Rags

risingsun wrote:Well, they would try and find a link wouldn't they Didge?  But it was The Sons of Iraq who got rid of the first lot of Al Qaeda in Iraq, after the invasion, and all that lot proves is that the Pentagon, not known for telling the truth, were desperate to justify the invasion because they knew they had fucked up royaly.

And now they are doing it again.

Its not a case of finding a link, there was links Sassy.
Again the problem with your argument is that it fails to recognise such groups have arisen from Wahhabism doctrine, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, ISIS, Boko haram, the list is endless. Now we know for a fact these groups have arisen to form control of nations. I am not trying to justify any invasion of Iraq. The war was wrong full stop. Like I said strategically wise it was a fatal error when the Taliban had not been defeated and contained, which created a nightmare to control so many inserrections in both countries. Priority was taken away at a critical time in Afghanistan The point is Saddam was was desperate because of the sanctions. The reality is for years ever since the Iraq and Iran conflict, there has been an ever increasing fight for supremacy by the opposing Islamic doctrines, all of which is ignored all the time. The reality is even without the invasion of Iraq, civil war would have come to Iraq through the Arab spring. Saddam would be facing the same problems as Syria has, where ISIS woould still have formed from both conflicts. The reality is the Iraq war did take out the one person keeping the factions in check, Saddam. It did not create these groups but by taking out Saddam, both Saudi and Iran used Iraq as a battle ground through insurgency attacks to gain supremecy in the country. Eventually as stated this would have happened with the Arab spings, where wahhabist terrorist groups have tried to take countrol in shia controlled nations like Iraq and Syria. We now see the opposite happen in Yemen, proving even more this has very little to do with western intervention, but of the ever ongoing fight between the factions. All the west did by the invasion was to open the door earlier to infighting, which as stated would have eventually happened.

Of course the west certainly shares blame for their part in this, but the real problem lies between the two Muslim factions.

risingsun wrote:Wish I knew, it might have helped.

Anyway, as I am in the middle of moving, must get on.  Will take it up later Rags

OK Sassy. I just thought at the time that if the French and others had said nothing in advance, the invasion might not have gone ahead.

risingsun wrote:Quill, Al Qaeda was in existence long before then, but had no presence in Iraq before the invasion, Sadam kept them out.

I agree.  Or, to put it more appropriately, the name was not attached to any group in Iraq until 2003. Its presence in Iraq began in 1999.

The Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started a terrorist group in Iraq in 1999, called Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad.  Some five months after the coalition invasion and occupation of Iraq, this group began bombing selected targets, including predominately, Shi'ite buildings, UN facilities and generally, Iraqi government institutions.

In October 2004 this group pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and became Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, commonly referred to as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

On 7 June 2006 Al-Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike by the US.

AQI was then taken over by Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who announced in October 2006 the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq.  This represented the morphing of the terrorist group AQI into a political movement, ISIS, or ISIL.

Original Quill wrote:

risingsun wrote:Quill, Al Qaeda was in existence long before then, but had no presence in Iraq before the invasion, Sadam kept them out.

I agree.  Or, to put it more appropriately, the name was not attached to any group in Iraq until 2003.  Its presence in Iraq began in 1999.

The Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started a terrorist group in Iraq in 1999, called Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad.  Some five months after the coalition invasion and occupation of Iraq, this group began bombing selected targets, including predominately, Shi'ite buildings, UN facilities and generally, Iraqi government institutions.

In October 2004 this group pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and became Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, commonly referred to as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

On 7 June 2006 Al-Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike by the US.

AQI was then taken over by Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who announced in October 2006 the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq.  This represented the morphing of the terrorist group AQI into a political movement, ISIS, or ISIL.

He was in Afghanistan until AFTER the Iraq invasion and had no foothold there until the insurgency WHICH DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL AFTER THE INVASION. And in 2003 he was kicked out by The Sons of Iraq but came back again.

risingsun wrote:

Original Quill wrote:

I agree.  Or, to put it more appropriately, the name was not attached to any group in Iraq until 2003.  Its presence in Iraq began in 1999.

The Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started a terrorist group in Iraq in 1999, called Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad.  Some five months after the coalition invasion and occupation of Iraq, this group began bombing selected targets, including predominately, Shi'ite buildings, UN facilities and generally, Iraqi government institutions.

In October 2004 this group pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and became Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, commonly referred to as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

On 7 June 2006 Al-Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike by the US.

AQI was then taken over by Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who announced in October 2006 the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq.  This represented the morphing of the terrorist group AQI into a political movement, ISIS, or ISIL.

He was in Afghanistan until AFTER the Iraq invasion and had no foothold there until the insurgency WHICH DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL AFTER THE INVASION.   And in 2003 he was kicked out by The Sons of Iraq but came back again.

Afghanistan?  I don't think so.  Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad was an Iraqi group, not Afghan. They even called it al Qaeda in Iraq after the invasion.