The Battle of the Military Theorists: Clausewitz vs. Sun Tzu

Brasidas wrote:While the strategic philosophies of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz align in some areas their ideas are diametrically opposed in other important ones. So which one should military professionals and strategists follow?

veya_victaous wrote:Sun Tzu
Because Hannibal still lost in the end, Cannae did not win the War therefore the Key Assumption of Clausewitz is faulty. Bringing the enemy to a major battle and winning soundly doesn't actually win wars.

I agree with a lot of the Article, the tendency towards 'total war' has had a negative impact on western society both morally and culturally.

Original Quill wrote:

Brasidas wrote:While the strategic philosophies of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz align in some areas their ideas are diametrically opposed in other important ones. So which one should military professionals and strategists follow?

Some experts differ as to where the two disagree.  It's made even more difficult when you take into account language differences and scope: as I understand it, Sun Tzi was more tactical, while Clausewitz was more political.  But that just reflects what different settings or audiences the two were dealing with...tribes, nation states, or just armies, etc.

Where do you find that the two disagree, Didge?

Brasidas wrote:

veya_victaous wrote:Sun Tzu
Because Hannibal still lost in the end, Cannae did not win the War therefore the Key Assumption of Clausewitz is faulty. Bringing the enemy to a major battle and winning soundly doesn't actually win wars.

I agree with a lot of the Article, the tendency towards 'total war' has had a negative impact on western society both morally and culturally.

WTF
Hannibal?
You need to learn the difference between tactical genius compared to a strategic genius. Mark McNeilly draws the comparison to Hannibal did you read to the end of the article YOU posted you'd have done better to accuse me of just repeating his point
Hannibal was a tactical genius and military genius to the point he had a massive psychological effect on the Romans.
We are talking strategy here which Hannibal failed at because he never capitalized on his great victories like Alexander the Great did.
Bringing an enemy to major battles has won wars and Alexander is a leading example of doing this and being extremely well out numbered in doing so. Again you ignore the psychological effect this will have on the enemy. Alexander followed up his victories with securing his position where he embraced the cultures of those he defeated. So it is very important to have decisive victories but equally important on how you follow them up.

Brasidas wrote:He can draw what he likes on Hannible as seen hannibal was a poor strategist.

That is absolutely gobbledygook about Babylon and the sacking of Persepolis was symbolic. Yeah that He had COMPLETE VICTORY of the preious ruler the fact that all the Vassal state eastern half of the empire resisted is neither here nor there as none had the capacity alone to resist what the empire combined could not.. that is just mopping up of The war was not won until Draius was taken. He was robbed of this victory by the Persions themselves. Even the war continued after this untill the extents of the former Persian Empire was over run. So no idea what you get your views on history as they seem as per usual wierd.

As to the French is also comical they could have easily been taken to task if not for the end of Henry V dying young. There is no doubt he would have taken the French throne. So it is easy to make such claims when such an event altered the course of events for the time.
Could of, would have, DIDN'T... And Really????? at no point in history is it ever recorded that there was an English siege of Paris

So you still need to fight major battles to defeat your enemies, some of which like the Nazi's you are left with no choice but to take to the field of battle to defeat them. I guess Russian Winter technically in the field Where again when this is done half the battle is then how you treat those defeated. This the allies worked so well at in both Germany and Japan, that both recovered to be both economical nations again. Agree with last part which is what the Article says and Why Sun Tzu is largely better as his is a more accurate understanding of the human psyche, there is a reason that Sun Tzu has been rewritten dozens of times to focus on the implication of his strategy to the modern business environment

Brasidas wrote:

Original Quill wrote:

Some experts differ as to where the two disagree.  It's made even more difficult when you take into account language differences and scope: as I understand it, Sun Tzi was more tactical, while Clausewitz was more political.  But that just reflects what different settings or audiences the two were dealing with...tribes, nation states, or just armies, etc.

Where do you find that the two disagree, Didge?

Hard to say Quill based on the differences on time they faced and in such different political climates.
To me both have their merits. Though if I had to choose it would be Clausewitz.
What would be interesting if you reversed each of them into each others time how they would have dealt with the situations they then faced

This observation must be borne in mind throughout the perusal of Clausewitz's History.

In respect to the return mentioned, it is forgotten by General Clausewitz that the army under the command of the Duke of Wellington was not, like that under the command of Marshal Prince Blücher, composed of the troops of all arms, and establishments of and belonging to one nation, but they belonged to several,....

On War, however, reflects fundamental issues that Clausewitz did not address in any detail. That is, On War is a book that, for all its length, attempts to focus narrowly on the practical problems of conducting military operations in war—it does not attempt to describe the character of the physical universe or the nature of man, nor to define such basic concepts as policy, politics, society, or the state.

Quote wrote:"On War, however, reflects fundamental issues that Clausewitz did not address in any detail. That is, On War is a book that, for all its length, attempts to focus narrowly on the practical problems of conducting military operations in war—it does not attempt to describe the character of the physical universe or the nature of man, nor to define such basic concepts as policy, politics, society, or the state."

Clausewitz FAQs wrote:Clausewitz's most famous argument is that "War is merely a continuation of politics"— or "of policy"—"by other means." (Here's an insightful recent discussion of the policy/politics issue.) This famous line is widely quoted and widely misunderstood. It is, in any case, subject to any number of very different—though sometimes equally insightful or useful—interpretations. This is true even if one is focused very narrowly on what Clausewitz himself meant by it. It is merely the tip of the iceberg of Clausewitzian theory, however.

veya wrote:What is the 'Policy' of ISIL?