Game Over! Finally, the IMF, OECD and IFS Say the UK Never Had the Biggest Structural Deficit

"Some people are on the pitch... they think it's all over... it is now!"

Kenneth Wolstenholme

The aim of this three-part article is to demonstrate that every deficit narrative and soundbite question or statement that you have heard parroted thousands of times are simply tricks aimed to mislead people.

Clearly, there would be no reason for concern if one chooses to parrot and hence endorse the claims promoted by these soundbites; if they were based on economic truths but unfortunately they simply do not stand up to the economic facts. For example, let us look at one more well-known parroted deficit soundbite question:

So you want spend more to reduce deficit? or How do you reduce the deficit by spending more?

This is an appeal to ignorance as you are suggesting something cannot be true because no one can understand it. Moreover, you know this line of argument will influence people because they lack the economic knowledge and do not have the facts. Hence, they can be influenced to assume what you want them to assume and in this case, it is the claim that expenditure increases the deficit.

This is an economic illiterate claim because increased government expenditure ceteris paribus adds more to revenue than it does to the debt because of the multiplier effect. Hence, the deficit falls because as income GDP rises; unemployment falls, which reduces expenditure and so, reduces the deficit.

Returning to the finale below, I expose the last two structural deficit claims No four and five

Claim No Four - Trick Two Begging The Question

"It is true to say, is it not, that in the run-up to the financial crisis Britain was running the worst structural deficit - that's the extra beyond the cycle - of any of the G7 countries?" - Marr 30th January 2011.

Andrew Marr like many others is strongly suggesting it is given and proven fact, which would naturally lead people to assume that it must be - begging the question. Nevertheless, the Coalitions much parroted narrative and soundbite accusation was in fact untrue at the time in January 2011 and months before. If we look at the available IMF published figures at the time (Oct 2010) we can see in 2006 the UK had the third highest structural deficit in the G7 at - 2.6% and in 2007 the second highest at - 3%. The OECD figures show the same as confirmed by the IFS who stated:

"On the OECD measure, the UK had a structural deficit of 3.5% of national income in 2007. This was the third highest among the G7 countries and the sixth highest among the 26 OECD countries" - IFS Page 10 paragraph three.

Four months later the IMF April 2011 figures showed the UK still had the third highest in 2006 at - 2.8% but in 2007 the UK had the highest at -3.2% albeit by only 0.1% above France.

However, the Coalition only finally earned it's soundbite well over two years later when the IMF published its October 2012 figures, which reported in both 2006 and 2007 the UK had the highest structural deficit at - 4.6% and - 5.2% respectively. Now, you may wonder why did the IMF figures doubled. Well, the OECD and IMF publish data; make calculations and forecasts based on figures and information supplied to them by the ONS. Hence, as the ONS in 2012 revised its historical fiscal and national accounts figures; the 2006 and 2007 structural deficits increased from the third highest to the highest. As the IMF email confirms:



They also point out it has never been cyclically adjusted beyond the cycle (which always increases it's calculation) but it was cyclically adjusted; as per usual.

Claim Five - Trick Four The Complex Question.

"Let's turn to the structural deficit because that's still at the heart of the argument between yourself and the Conservatives. It is true to say, is it not, that in the run-up to the financial crisis Britain was running the worst structural deficit ....of any of the G7 countries?" - Marr 30th January 2011.

By agreeing the UK had the worst structural deficit; you also confirm that you were overspending and that you created the mess we inherited - the original argument. However, if you disagree you are labelled a deficit denier. Either way Ed Ball cannot answer the question without looking guilty. This moment caused the media frenzy of:

Aaaaaaaaaaw! Ed Balls denied having a structural deficit and he refused to apologise. Look Mummy watch him deny it - play ground petty pointless politics.

This is a classic red herring because it sensualises the irrelevant none issue of watching Ed Balls deny the existence of a structural deficit and it is used to lead people to assume, that it conclusively proves the argument has been won. Moreover, it acts as a ploy to distract and avoid providing evidence of overspending and "the mess we inherited".

In answer to the question, the IMF actually said the UK had the third highest structural deficit at the time and the last time we Conservatives were in office between 1979 - 1997 we had 18 structural deficits in 18 years - claim one. More importantly, people have been had because structural deficits occur in most years and even in the run up to recessions - claim one. Hence, the only thing the denial proves is that Ed Balls denied having a structural deficit; just as there has been one in nearly all others years.

Finally, there was no overspending because the Treasury, ONS and OBR say from the time Labour entered office in 1996/7 and prior to the recession 2006/7 the structural deficit was cut by 82%, the budget deficit by 85%, PSNB borrowing by 32% and the debt by 16% - claim two.

So there you have it; the structural deficit is simply an alarmist ruse employed to prey on people's fears to justify austerity to achieve our main goal of lower taxes. Essentially George Osborne has taken a leaf out of Ronald Reagan playbook. Overall, the whole thing is a kin to Phoebe scaremongering Rachel by telling her to leave the plane because "she has a feeling there's something wrong with the left phalange" watch



Yes, I think it was Samuel Taylor Coleridge who once said: "In politics, what begins in fear usually ends in folly".

To conclude, as the truth is the greatest enemy of the lie share this on Facebook, Twitter, Google +,WhatsApp, email and Blog it so that the truth can be discovered by all. Finally, may I say:

"May the odds be ever in your favor."

― Suzanne Collins

http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ramesh-patel/deficit-myths_b_7157848.html

Finally the truth is out there!

So fuck off Tories, finally proof Ed Balls was right, we did not overspend, backed by the IMF, OECD and IFS. Stick that in your pipe and blow it our your arse.

Rubbing this in to every Tory I can think of, your legs have been wiped out from under you.

More evidence, and I see the cowardly RW are avoiding this thread like the plague:

Labour overspending did not trigger financial crash, says senior civil servant

Permanent secretary to Treasury, Sir Nicholas Macpherson, contradicts Tory pre-election claims, saying financial crisis was ‘a banking crisis pure and simple’

The permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Nicholas Macpherson, has argued that the 2008 financial crisis was “a banking crisis pure and simple”, contradicting Conservative claims that it was caused by Labour overspending.

His surprising remarks come after Ed Miliband came under pressure on a leader’s question time debate last week that Labour government had overspent, a view strengthened by the now notorious letter left by the former treasury chief secretary Liam Byrne to his successor in 2010 that there was “no money left”.

In a largely challenging review of Mr Osborne’s Economic Experiment, a book by the Observer economics columnist William Keegan, Macpherson wrote: “Some of Keegan’s book resonates. The 2008 crisis was a banking crisis pure and simple. Excessive risk had built up in the system; the regulators failed to appreciate the scale of that risk or to address it.

“As he puts it, it was ‘a failure of the Group of Seven economic policymaking establishment’, myself included. Inevitably, countries with bigger banking sectors, notably the UK, were worse affected.”

Miliband has always insisted that the banking crisis caused the deficit – not the other way round but admits that the last Labour government did not do enough to reform the banks.

But the Tories have put economic credibility at the heart of their election campaign after polls showing a significant proportion of the public hold the last Labour government responsible for the 2008 economic crisis, and trust coalition ministers more with the economy than Miliband.

The review, in the publication Civil Service Quarterly, continues: “But in one sense it doesn’t matter what caused public borrowing to blow out in 2008-09. Given that the financial service industry was not going to return to its previous size and shape, the government had to face up to the increasing mismatch between tax and spending.

“You cannot run a deficit of 10% of GDP for any length of time in a world where there is little or no inflation. Alistair Darling (the former Labour chancellor) recognised this in 2009-10. And George Osborne, David Laws and Danny Alexander chose to take fiscal tightening further in the summer of 2010.”

Macpherson also does not accept the claims that the crisis in 2010 put Britain in the exact same economic boat as Greece – another claim made repeatedly by the Conservatives.

He writes: “Keegan is right to point out that the UK is not Greece. It has much stronger institutions and – most important of all – a floating exchange rate. But the longer a government runs a large deficit, the greater the risk that it hits an inflection point where the markets take fright, and the cost of funding rises sharply: in this respect the eurozone experience is relevant.

“The problem for policymakers is that ex ante it is difficult to know where the inflection point is, and that strengthens the case for erring on the side of caution. That’s why the last government set a debt rule of 40% of GDP and the current one is seeking to get debt on a downward path.”

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/may/03/senior-tory-financial-crash-was-purely-a-banking-crisis-not-labour-overspend?CMP=share_btn_tw

The deficit measures the gap between money going into government, and money going out. If the government spends more than it receives, it is in deficit. Otherwise it is in surplus. You can find our full article on the deficit here.
In 2014-15 the deficit is estimated to have been about £90 billion, or £60 billion if you don’t include investment spending.
This is different from government debt, which measures how much the government owes in total. In February 2015 the debt was estimated to be about £1.5 trillion, or 80% of GDP. This figure excludes public sector banks.
Common claims:

“Five years ago, the budget deficit was more than 10% of GDP, the highest in our peacetime history”

The deficit in 2009-10 was 10.2% of GDP.
The Office for Budget Responsibility have data from 1948 onwards, and this is the highest the deficit has been in this period.
It was also the highest in cash terms at £154 billion, and the highest when adjusted for inflation.

“The deficit has been halved”

This is correct when looking at the deficit as a proportion of the UK’s economic output (GDP) each year: this has gone from 10% in 2009-10 to 5% in 2014-15.
The absolute value of the deficit has not halved, though. Over the same period it went from £154 billion to £90 billion.
Reducing the deficit is not the same as ‘paying down the debt’.

“George Osborne has borrowed more than he claimed he was going to back in 2010″

The government is borrowing more than it planned to: the Institute for Fiscal Studies says that from 2010/11 to 2014/15 the government has borrowed approximately £100 billion more than it planned to at the start of this parliament.
However, this is not due to a failure to cut spending; it’s just that the economy hasn’t performed as well as was expected. This means the government has raised less money in tax.

“The Coalition have failed to meet their deficit targets”

The Coalition is set to meet their supplementary target to have debt falling as a proportion of GDP. The balanced budget part of the mandate only requires that the government plan for a balanced budget three years in the future.
As the IFS point out, the government can technically meet this moving target without ever achieving budget balance.

“The debt has doubled”

Debt has risen, but not doubled. It has risen from just under £1 trillion in April 2010 to about £1.5 trillion in February 2015. As a proportion of GDP, it’s risen from just over 60% to 80%


https://fullfact.org/economy/election_2015_debt_deficit-43413

Gross National Debt
FY 2015* £1.36 trillion
FY 2014 £1.26 trillion
FY 2013 £1.19 trillion
FY 2012 £1.10 trillion
FY 2011 £0.91 trillion
FY 2010 £0.76 trillion
FY 2009 £0.62 trillion
FY 2008 £0.53 trillion

http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_national_debt_chart.html

Nemesis wrote:The deficit measures the gap between money going into government, and money going out. If the government spends more than it receives, it is in deficit. Otherwise it is in surplus. You can find our full article on the deficit here.
In 2014-15 the deficit is estimated to have been about £90 billion, or £60 billion if you don’t include investment spending.
This is different from government debt, which measures how much the government owes in total. In February 2015 the debt was estimated to be about £1.5 trillion, or 80% of GDP. This figure excludes public sector banks.
Common claims:

“Five years ago, the budget deficit was more than 10% of GDP, the highest in our peacetime history”

The deficit in 2009-10 was 10.2% of GDP.
The Office for Budget Responsibility have data from 1948 onwards, and this is the highest the deficit has been in this period.
It was also the highest in cash terms at £154 billion, and the highest when adjusted for inflation.

“The deficit has been halved”

This is correct when looking at the deficit as a proportion of the UK’s economic output (GDP) each year: this has gone from 10% in 2009-10 to 5% in 2014-15.
The absolute value of the deficit has not halved, though. Over the same period it went from £154 billion to £90 billion.
Reducing the deficit is not the same as ‘paying down the debt’.

“George Osborne has borrowed more than he claimed he was going to back in 2010″

The government is borrowing more than it planned to: the Institute for Fiscal Studies says that from 2010/11 to 2014/15 the government has borrowed approximately £100 billion more than it planned to at the start of this parliament.
However, this is not due to a failure to cut spending; it’s just that the economy hasn’t performed as well as was expected. This means the government has raised less money in tax.

“The Coalition have failed to meet their deficit targets”

The Coalition is set to meet their supplementary target to have debt falling as a proportion of GDP. The balanced budget part of the mandate only requires that the government plan for a balanced budget three years in the future.
As the IFS point out, the government can technically meet this moving target without ever achieving budget balance.

“The debt has doubled”

Debt has risen, but not doubled. It has risen from just under £1 trillion in April 2010 to about £1.5 trillion in February 2015. As a proportion of GDP, it’s risen from just over 60% to 80%


https://fullfact.org/economy/election_2015_debt_deficit-43413

This will help dumb in down for you sassy to understand.

Dress it up any way you want but it's a huge fail in every respect.
The deficit was supposed to be gone by now. And the economy didn't perform as well as expected! Oh, who was in charge of the economy and and who set the targets?

The OP is bang on the money.

Not only hasn't the deficit gone but the National Debt has doubled. What the OP shows is that the facts do not support in any way that Labour were the cause of the crash, but it was a Banking crisis, which would have brought down the whole economy is Brown hadn't have stepped in.

http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/feb/21/gordon-brown-saved-banks

In early October 2008, the world's financial system was on the brink of systemic collapse. Despite the announcement of a multi-million pound bail-out, major British banks were about to go bust.

World markets were in a death spiral. There was a vertiginous sell-off across the board as investors dumped stocks, commodities and currencies. The markets had no faith in their own ability to stabilise, nor in the capacity of governments to rescue them. The crisis of capitalism so long predicted by communists had arrived even if they were no longer in a position to take advantage of it. Every major index was plunging, day after day. Wall Street suffered the worst week in its history. Stocks on the Dow lost 18% of their value in five days. General Motors, once the pride of the American car industry, was now worth less than it was in 1929. London and Frankfurt were down 21% on the week. Japan's Nikkei index crashed 24%. "Black Friday", the name given to 10 October, was too tepid a headline for what was happening. There was no precedent for this combination of a worldwide collapse in asset values, a global run on banks and the freezing up of all credit markets.

Major depositors were now so scared about the state of RBS and some other British banks that they were trying to withdraw – and willing to pay large penalties for early withdrawal – all their money. At the Treasury, an alarmed Paul Myners, the City minister, saw that this "was happening with more than one bank".

This was the day, of all days, that Brown was spending out of London on a "regional tour" along the M4 corridor. He had embarked on it as part of a campaign to explain to voters why he was giving billions to the banks. "I want you to know that we are doing this for you," he argued in a podcast hurriedly recorded that morning in which he contended that the bail-out was vital to save jobs and businesses. So it was from a train carriage with imperfect phone reception that he spoke to Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and other European leaders to urge them to recapitalise their banks as well.

By the end of Black Friday, says John Gieve, then deputy Governor of the Bank of England, HBOS and RBS had "run out of money". Alistair Darling agrees "they had run out of capital". Treasury officials confirm that these two massive banks would not be able to open their doors on Monday morning.

This was a stunning development for the bankers and the politicians. If both HBOS and RBS went down, it was thought highly likely that they would tip over Barclays, which would in turn crash Lloyds TSB. The chain reaction could topple the majority, even perhaps all, of the major British banks. Sober experts like the economist John Eatwell "thought there was a real possibility of a total banking collapse. That is, the banks actually shutting their doors and all the cash machines stopping, which would be a complete disaster." Alistair Darling believed "we faced a situation where the banking system right across the world, never mind Britain, could have collapsed". Paul Myners agrees that they were now "very close" to "a series of dominoes falling" and "a systemic collapse of the banking system". John Gieve concurs that "we were right at the brink of two of our major banks closing and if those two closed that would have a knock-on effect. You could have got Northern Rock times ten." Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, was also in no doubt that "not since the beginning of the First World War has our banking system been so close to collapse.'

That would be a cataclysm without precedent. Cheques would be valueless. Credit cards would be useless. With the cash machines shut down, families would not be able to buy food. "Literally you wouldn't have any cash. The money would disappear," says one leading economist. Most of those things regarded as the essentials of modern society would cease to function.

Most Britons understood that something serious was unfolding, but the awesome gravity of this crisis was concealed from the public precisely because of the sheer terror that would have been ignited had the truth been known. Few outside government and the banks fully appreciated just how close the country was to an apocalyptic implosion of its entire banking system. Britain teetered on the lip of the abyss.

The bankers were called back into the Treasury on Friday evening for what became known among those involved in the crisis negotiations as "the long weekend". In the words of Alistair Darling: "The deadline that all of us set ourselves was seven o'clock on Monday morning when the markets would open. You couldn't have the markets opening with the deal not done. That would have been catastrophic." They had just 48 hours to avert apocalypse. They worked "through the night every night" from the evening of Friday to breakfast-time on Monday. Some at the Treasury found it "slightly surreal" as "all these bankers slipped in and wandered around the building, looking lost". There were so many people crowding into the Treasury that they ran out of chairs. Bankers, lawyers and six-figure consultants ended up sitting on the floor to do their business.

The situation was further ­complicated because both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor were out of the country for stretches of this pivotal weekend. Darling flew to America for a meeting of the finance ministers of the G7. The mood in Washington was deeply frightened. "People were in a state of shock about the scale of what was happening," says one present. "Stock markets around the world were falling by 5% a day and looked like they would never stop." Darling responded with anger and alarm when he was shown the first draft of a statement for the G7. He agreed with Tom Scholar, the managing director of International and Finance at the Treasury, that it was "a crappy communiqué": three pages of platitudinous waffle which would make the panic worse. Hank Paulson looked a wreck. He was publicly still committed to his contentious TARP scheme, which had only won approval from Congress at the second attempt. Privately, the US Treasury Secretary revealed to Darling that he was preparing to switch tracks and fall in with the idea of recapitalisation. The British were suspicious of Christine Lagarde. They feared the French Finance Minister was under instructions from the Elysée Palace not to agree anything of substance so that Nicolas Sarkozy could claim the glory by announcing a grand plan at the European Council in Brussels the following week.

Darling argued to his G7 counterparts that recapitalising banks with public money – the British approach – was the only solution with a chance of working in these circumstances. Mervyn King was also at the Washington talks. The Governor took to using a line from another King, Elvis Presley. What they needed, he said, was "a little less conversation, a little more action".

They agreed a five-point plan which included a pledge to prevent the collapse of "systemically important banks" by using taxpayers' money to buy up stakes. The final communiqué lacked precision, but for the first time there was something resembling a plausible global framework for bank recapitalisation.

While the Chancellor was selling that to the finance ministers in America, the Prime Minister was promoting the British plan to his European counterparts at a meeting to which he had not originally been invited. Sarkozy asked Brown to join his summit of leaders of the eurozone at the Elysée Palace. At one point, the French President said: "You know, Gordon, I should not like you. You are Scottish, we have nothing in common and you are an economist. But somehow, Gordon, I love you." Just in case Brown got the wrong idea, the Frenchman quickly added: 'But not in a sexual way.'

Also present at the Elysée were José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission; Jean-Claude Trichet, the chairman of the European Central Bank; Silvio Berlusconi of Italy; and Angela Merkel. The scepticism of the German Chancellor had been a formidable obstacle to a comprehensive solution. At a Paris summit a fortnight before, Merkel declared: "It's up to each country to clean up its own shit." She was now shifting her position, not least because her officials were constantly in and out with updates about teetering German banks. To one present at this conclave, it was "a mad meeting" as Brown and his European counterparts clustered around a tiny table in the Elysée discussing what to do. At 8.30 that evening, Paris time, the French President came out to tell the media that they had broadly embraced recapitalisation schemes along the lines of the British plan.

Darling left Washington on Saturday night on the red-eye to Heathrow and landed back in London at breakfast-time on Sunday. When he arrived at the Treasury, the negotiations with the stricken British bankers had made important progress. The dynamic was changed by the fright they received on Friday. "When we began to have one-to-one meetings on Saturday, it was pretty clear to all the major banks that needed capital that they would have to do a deal," says Paul Myners. He and John Kingman, the Second Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, found that HBOS, Lloyds TSB and RBS were now willing to accept that they had to have immediate help. Barclays, though still preferring to recapitalise from foreign sources rather than the British Government, saw the necessity for urgent action. "No one wanted to be naked on Monday morning without a deal in place."

According to John Gieve, "essentially the Treasury laid out the terms on which it was prepared to support them and they had to accept it." In one of the gaps between meetings in Myners's office, someone referred to a "negotiation". Sir Fred Goodwin, RBS's chief executive, remarked: "This is not a negotiation; it is a drive-by shooting." His tone was more fatalistic than furious. "He said this with a rueful smile."

Until the Sunday evening, some of the bankers were "still fighting the proposition" that they had to agree to the terms and conditions offered by the Government. Darling eventually said to them: "You've got a choice. We're going to offer capital and we're going to impose conditions. If you don't like it, there's an alternative, but that's too awful to contemplate." In a display of brinkmanship untypical of the undemonstrative and cautious Chancellor, he declared: "I'm staying until midnight and then I'm going to bed. If you haven't done the deal by then, it's too late."

The bankers were "more or less signed up" to the broad structure when the Chancellor took himself off to bed, telling officials he had to get some rest when he would be presenting the deal to MPs and on the media the next day. As he slept, the lights continued to burn at the Treasury as the bankers wrangled over details. "That is what these people do," says Darling. They were getting "down to percentages", haggling over the precise size of the stake the Government would take in the rescued banks. At five o'clock, with just two hours left before the deadline to announce an agreement in advance of the markets opening, Darling held a stock-taking session in his ground-floor study at Number 11. The Chancellor was joined by Kingman, Myners, the civil servant Tom Scholar and the minister Shriti Vadera, none of whom had had any sleep at all. They were agreed they had a deal they could live with. Now they needed Gordon Brown's sign-off. The Prime Minister had returned from Paris late on the Sunday night and was still asleep in the flat above Downing Street. "Who's going to wake him up?" asked Darling. Eyes fixed on Shriti Vadera, the person in the room closest to Brown. "You need to get him up." She went through the connecting door into Number 10 and sought out the night duty clerk. "We need the Prime Minister," she said. "Can you get Gordon up?" "No," the duty clerk laughingly refused. "You go and get Gordon up."

Vadera made her way upstairs to the Browns' flat. She had never been in there before and stumbled around in the dark trying to locate the bedroom. Tripping over a child's tricycle, she disturbed Sarah Brown, who assumed one of her sons was up. The Prime Minister's wife shouted out: "John, go back to bed." Vadera identified herself: "Sarah, it's Shriti." A familiar growl then rumbled from the Browns' bedroom: "What's going on?"

Soon afterwards, the Prime Minister came down to join the meeting in the Chancellor's study. A purple tie at half mast around his neck, he "looked like a man who had jumped out of bed and thrown his clothes on in thirty seconds". Brown asked the multi-billion-pound question: "Will it work?" When the rest of them sounded positive, he gave his seal of approval. They had just met the deadline. Before the markets opened on Monday, it was announced that the Government was taking stakes in HBOS, Lloyds TSB and RBS in return for a £37 billion injection of capital while Barclays would be recapitalising from private sources. The state was now the majority shareholder of RBS and would own 40% of the new bank created by merging HBOS and Lloyds. Britain's banks opened their doors that morning. The cash machines still worked. As far as most people knew, it was business as usual.

One very senior civil servant, in many ways a sceptic about Gordon Brown's leadership skills, gives him much of the credit for bold action in this crisis: "Gordon was prepared to say: 'We need to bail them out' despite the political risks. He took the lead and then allowed Alistair to do it."

Britain had come close to tumbling into the abyss. Whatever else the rescue of that long weekend ultimately failed to do, it successfully set an example to the world and saved the country from the apocalypse of a total banking collapse.



It was the reason why the National Debt rose in 2009, bailing out the banks. So what does Cameron do? The very people that caused it he gives knighthoods to and brings into government, while in the rest of the world they are prosecuted. And the reason Canada and Australia were not affected so badly was being they don't have the dependence on the financial section that Europe, Britain and the USA do.

The bank bail outs aside, labour spending was massively more than we were getting in taxes and they left office with spending commitments of £170billiow a year more than was coming in in taxes, ie borrowing of £170billion a year.


The coalition has introduced cuts in spending that now have the annual spending of about £90billion a year more than we get in taxes, meaning borrowing of £90billion a year.


All of these cuts have been opposed by labour, 'too far and too fast' was the cry, but now it seems labour mugs like you are complaining that the cuts were not deep enough!!!



The lies and spin from you idiots is all you have!!!

Any incoming govt has to continue with the spending commitments left by the outgoing govt for at least a year or two...



Do you know nothing...!?



That post is just repeating leftie BBC propaganda... just more lies and spin!!!

Oh Tommy, you are sooooooooooooooo desperate. Have a look at the latest Survation poll lol

I don't listen to made up bullshit polls.



Their aim is purely to manipulate public opinion, not accurately reflect it.

You wish!

It is true!


Evidence...


In one poll when the raw data was analysed, it showed that about 100 people said lib dems and gave them 13% while over 200 people said UKIP but were given only 9%!!!




Real UKIP support is near 25%.

Funny that init

heres a lefty whingeing about "structural defict"

when the same person agrees with ben who reckoned we shoud go further into debt to accomodate hordes of
illiterate
uneducated
unheathy

economic "refugees"

yeah lets spend billions accomodating the poor of africa
and yet

nasty tories have a large structural defict


anyone see a paradox here...or is it more like hypocrisy we see....

Lefties have developed a sort of 'quantum thinking' where two opposite opinions can coexist at the same time as well as neither, within two empty spaces... the left side and the right side of a leftie brain!!!



Resulting in constant 'double speak'...!