Two Fatal Problems with the Fine-Tuning Argument (2015)

I. Introduction

Some theists think that scientific findings provide evidence for God's existence. For instance, some of them have taken the beginning of the universe in a "Big Bang" to be evidence that God created it ex nihilo. More recently touted findings emphasize the uniquely life-permitting values of the universe's fundamental physical constants. If any of six constants had been "set" at even a slightly different value from its actual value, then life as we know it would have been impossible. The remarkable fact that the universe's physical constants happen to have these uniquely life-permitting values suggests, according to some theists, that they were "fine-tuned" by God to have these values. More specifically, it is the extreme improbability of the constants having, by chance, the uniquely life-permitting values they do have that suggests that God "fine-tuned" the constants to these values. This is the so-called "fine-tuning argument," which I regard as the most promising theistic teleological argument.

Despite its initial promise, however, there are grounds for rejecting the fine-tuning argument as a justification for theism (or even supernaturalism). As the title of this paper suggests, there are (at least) two fatal problems with the argument. The first is that it contains an internal conflict, and the second is that it misuses improbability to conjure up support for supernaturalism. Once these problems are brought to light, it is evident that the fine-tuning argument supports neither theism nor supernaturalism.

II. A More-Detailed Formulation of the Fine-Tuning Argument

Before presenting my two fatal problems with the fine-tuning argument, it is worth spelling out a more detailed, formal version of the argument:

(P1) Life as we know it requires that the universe's physical constants have their actual values instead of some other set of values. 


(P2) The actual values of the universe's physical constants are uniquely life-permitting. (from P1)



(P3) The uniquely life-permitting values of the universe's physical constants are due to necessity, chance, or supernatural fine-tuning.



(P4) The uniquely life-permitting values of the universe's physical constants are not due to necessity.



(P5) Given the enormous (perhaps infinite) number of possible values for the universe's physical constants, it is extremely improbable for these constants to have, by chance, the uniquely life-permitting values instead of some other, non-life-permitting set of values.



(P6) The uniquely life-permitting values of the universe's physical constants are probably not due to chance. (from P5)



(P7) The uniquely life-permitting values of the universe's physical constants are probably due to supernatural fine-tuning. (from P3, P4, & P6)
(C) Therefore, it is defeasibly reasonable to attribute the uniquely life-permitting values of the universe's physical constants to God.


http://infidels.org/library/modern/ryan_stringer/fine-tuning.html

lol..not to mention the big bang has no empirical evidence supporting it, which is even more ironic when you consider the atheists demand empirical evidence to believe in God...

double standards... maybe...lol

heavenlyfatheragain wrote:lol..not to mention the big bang has no empirical evidence supporting it, which is even more ironic when you consider the atheists demand empirical evidence to believe in God...

double standards... maybe...lol

The evidence of the big bang is a lot to go into, but it's the most logical explanation for the observed, ongoing expansion of the universe.